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ABSTRACT
The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a 
software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment using a 
personal computer running the Microsoft Windows? operating system.  SAPHIRE is primarily 
funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  The role of the INL in this project is that 
of software developer and tester.  This development takes place using formal software development 
procedures and is subject to quality assurance (QA) processes.  The purpose of this document is to 
describe how the SAPHIRE software QA is performed for Version 6 and 7, what constitutes its parts, 
and limitations of those processes. 
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FOREWORD
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has developed the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on 
Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) software used to perform probabilistic risk assessments 
(PRAs) on a personal computer. SAPHIRE enables users to supply basic event data, create and solve fault 
and event trees, perform uncertainty analyses, and generate reports. In that way, analysts can perform PRAs 
for any complex system, facility, or process. 
SAPHIRE can be used to model a plant's response to initiating events, quantify core damage frequencies, 
and identify important contributors to core damage (Level 1 PRA). The program can also be used to 
evaluate containment failure and release models for severe accident conditions, given that core damage has 
occurred (Level 2 PRA). In so doing, the analyst could build the PRA model assuming that the reactor is 
initially at full power, low power, or shutdown. In addition, SAPHIRE can be used to analyze both internal 
and external events, and it includes special features for transforming models built for internal event analysis 
to models for external event analysis. It can also be used in a limited manner to quantify the frequency of 
release consequences (Level 3 PRA). Because this software is a very detailed technical tool, users should be 
familiar with PRA concepts and methods used to perform such analyses. 
SAPHIRE has evolved with advances in computer technology. The versions currently in use (6 and 7) run 
in the Microsoft Windows® environment. A user-friendly interface, Graphical Evaluation Module (GEM), 
streamlines and automates selected SAPHIRE inputs and processes for performing event assessments. 
SAPHIRE has also evolved with users' needs, and Versions 6 and 7 include new features and capabilities 
for developing and using larger, more complex models. For example, Version 7 can solve up to 2 million 
sequences and includes enhancements for cut set slicing, event tree rule linkage, and reporting options. 
This NUREG-series report comprises seven volumes, which address SAPHIRE/GEM Versions 6 and 7. 
Volume 1, "Overview/Summary," gives an overview of the functions available in SAPHIRE and presents 
general instructions for using the software. Volume 2, "Technical Reference," discusses the theoretical 
background behind the SAPHIRE functions. Volume 3, "SAPHIRE Users' Manual," provides installation 
instructions and a step-by-step approach to using the program's features. Volume 4, "SAPHIRE Tutorial 
Manual," provides an example of the overall process of constructing a PRA database. Volume 5, 
"GEM/GEMDATA Reference Manual," discusses the use of GEM. Volume 6, "SAPHIRE Quality 
Assurance (QA) Manual," discusses QA methods and tests. Lastly, Volume 7, "SAPHIRE Data Loading 
Manual," assists the user in entering PRA data into SAPHIRE using the built-in MAR-D ASCII-text file 
data transfer process. 
Christiana H. Lui, Director 
Division of Risk Analysis 
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Product quality is a key component of SAPHIRE.  The SAPHIRE QA processes documented in the report 
provides the basis for setting quality objectives, progress, and the necessary framework for quality 
improvements.   The QA plan will evolve as the SAPHIRE product is enhanced to provide the end user 
with solutions to their technical problems and cost-effectively meet user expectations.  A majority of the 
changes within the SAPHIRE software occur because the end user has identified characteristics that provide 
“new potential”, thus resulting in SAPHIRE evolving as each new feature is discovered and implemented.  
Therefore, the majority of software maintenance comes about not because of deficiencies in the code, but 
because it was modified to embrace improved methods for risk and reliability assessment. 
In order to ensure the quality of the SAPHIRE software, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) uses a variety 
of software development methods, including: 
? Controlling software versions for both the formally released SAPHIRE versions, as well as for 
source code. 
? Following a standard approach to bug fixes and new features. 
? Using a cyclical design process to prototype changes. 
? Performing acceptance tests that the software must pass prior to official release. 
The source code version control library requires that individual programmers “check-out” all files that they 
intend to modify.  Prior to “check-in”, programmers must explain any changes made.  A record is kept of all 
changes, both as explained by the developer, and as individual copies of each version of a file.  At any time, 
the developer can retrieve past versions intact, if necessary.  Since the SAPHIRE software program is 
continually modified, the version control procedure ensures a methodical approach to tracking and releasing 
these changes. 
As new features and bug fixes are made, the INL developers follow a standard approach to integrating these 
items into SAPHIRE.  For bug fixes, the developers take notes from the user describing the general context 
of the bug, as well as step-by-step actions to reproduce the bugs.  This bug information includes acquiring a 
copy of the user’s database, when necessary.  Then, the bug is classified and prioritized according to 
severity.  A bug is considered “minor” if it inconveniences the user, but a workaround exists to produce a 
correct answer. A bug is “major” if it prevents the user from obtaining the correct answer. Software 
enhancements follow much the same approach as bug fixes.  Enhancements are prioritized and 
implemented, with intermediate testing by the developer and often by the requestor.  Once the process and 
results appear acceptable, the feature is added to the next official release. 
The level of effort for the software design process corresponds to the size and complexity of the proposed 
change.  Developers use a cyclical prototyping design methodology as a means to clarify and refine the 
change. The prototyping process involves the requestor throughout development. The developers will 
interact with the requestor(s) both initially and throughout the design and development process to ensure the 
change accomplishes the expected goal.  
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Prior to any official SAPHIRE release of versions 6 and 7, the software is run through a series of automated 
tests.  The tests simulate user input to the computer through a test script, and results are captured and 
compared to expected results.  This ensures that given a static input PRA file, the risk or reliability results 
from SAPHIRE will be consistent from one release to the next.  These acceptance tests were developed by 
first identifying the critical tasks performed in a PRA.  Then these tasks were mapped to the SAPHIRE 
functions that perform these tasks.  The critical functions were determined to include the following: 
1. Fault tree analysis 
2. Event tree and sequence analysis  
3. End state analysis 
4. Importance measures analysis 
5. Uncertainty analysis 
6. Change sets 
7. Data utility functions 
8. GEM module functionality 
A change is not considered complete until the results have been tested and found reasonable. Developers 
and key users will test to see that the change works as expected and is free of defects.  Prior to official 
release of a version, SAPHIRE’s automated test suite must complete successfully.  The success of the suite 
is a good indicator that the new change does not adversely affect other areas of the code. 
x
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has developed a powerful personal computer (PC) 
software application for performing probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), called Systems Analysis 
Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE).  
Using SAPHIRE on a PC, an analyst can perform a PRA for any complex system, facility, or process. 
Regarding nuclear power plants, SAPHIRE can be used to model a plant’s response to initiating events, 
quantify associated core damage frequencies and identify important contributors to core damage (Level 1 
PRA).  It can also be used to evaluate containment failure and release models for severe accident conditions, 
given that core damage has occurred (Level 2 PRA). It can be used for a PRA assuming that the reactor is at 
full power, at low power, or at shutdown conditions. Furthermore, it can be used to analyze both internal and 
external initiating events, and it has special features for transforming models built for internal event analysis 
to models for external event analysis. It can also be used in a limited manner to quantify risk for release 
consequences to both the public and the environment (Level 3 PRA). For all of these models, SAPHIRE can 
evaluate the uncertainty inherent in the probabilistic models. 
SAPHIRE development and maintenance has been undertaken by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The 
INL began development of a PRA software application on a PC in the mid 1980s when the enormous 
potential of PC applications started being recognized. The initial version, Integrated Risk and Reliability 
Analysis System (IRRAS), was released by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (now Idaho National 
Laboratory) in February 1987. IRRAS was an immediate success, because it clearly demonstrated the 
feasibility of performing reliability and risk assessments on a PC and because of its tremendous need 
(Russell 1987). Development of IRRAS continued over the following years. However, limitations to the 
state of the-art during those initial stages led to the development of several independent modules to 
complement IRRAS capabilities (Russell 1990; 1991; 1992; 1994). These modules were known as Models 
and Results Database (MAR-D), System Analysis and Risk Assessment (SARA), and Fault Tree, Event 
Tree, and Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (FEP).  
IRRAS was developed primarily for performing a Level 1 PRA. It contained functions for creating event 
trees and fault trees, defining accident sequences and basic event failure data, solving system fault trees and 
accident sequence event trees, quantifying cut sets, performing sensitivity and uncertainty analyses, 
documenting the results, and generating reports.
MAR-D provided the means for loading and unloading PRA data from the IRRAS relational database. 
MAR-D used a simple ASCII data format. This format allowed interchange of data between PRAs 
performed with different types of software; data of PRAs performed by different codes could be converted 
into the data format appropriate for IRRAS, and vice-versa. 
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SARA provided the capability to access PRA data and results (descriptive facility information, failure data, 
event trees, fault trees, plant system model diagrams, and dominant accident sequences) stored in MAR-D. 
With SARA, a user could review and compare results of existing PRAs. It also provided the capability for 
performing limited sensitivity analyses. SARA was intended to provide easier access to PRA results to users 
that did not have the level of sophistication required to use IRRAS.
FEP provided common access to the suite of graphical editors. The fault tree and event tree editors were 
accessible through FEP as well as through IRRAS, whereas the piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) 
editor was only accessible through FEP. With these editors an analyst could construct from scratch as well as 
modify fault tree, event tree, and plant drawing graphical representations needed in a PRA.
Previous versions of SAPHIRE consisted of the suite of these modules. Taking advantage of the Windows 
95 (or Windows NT) environment, all of these modules were integrated into SAPHIRE Version 6; more 
features were added; and the user interface was simplified.  With the release of SAPHIRE versions 5 and 6, 
INL included a separate module called the Graphical Evaluation Module (GEM). GEM provides a highly 
specialized user interface with SAPHIRE, automating SAPHIRE process steps for evaluating operational 
events at commercial nuclear power plants. In particular, GEM implements many of the accident sequence 
precursor (ASP) program analysis methods. Using GEM, an analyst can estimate the risk associated with 
operational events very efficiently and expeditiously.   
The SAPHIRE Quality Assurance (QA) Manual provides the details to identify the methodology used to 
provide a planned and systematic approach required to guarantee the quality of the SAPHIRE software.  
To ensure the required quality is satisfied, the SAPHIRE development team applies the methodology 
needed to verify the design quality and to validate the software quality into the SAPHIRE software 
product.  In addition, this document provides an overview into the general SAPHIRE QA process.
Specifically, the report first outlines and describe the key part of the process.  Second, the report 
discusses the formal testing program that is used to ensure software quality during the development 
cycle.  Lastly, it concludes the report by reviewing the topics addressed. 
In order to provide context to the complexity of a modern analysis code such as SAPHIRE (and its 
associated implications on testing), a list of salient features found in the software is provided in Appendix 
A.  The combination of breadth and depth in these features shows the potential complexity that may be 
found in software as extensive as SAPHIRE. 
Appendix B provides a template for a QA Checklist that is used to perform periodic inspections to 
monitor the SAPHIRE product quality.  The checklist provides the identification for each inspection 
topic, an indication if the inspection, passed, failed, or was not applicable, as well as a column that may 
be used to insert specific comments regarding the inspection topic.  Options for methods used to conduct 
the evaluation are random sampling, interviews, and observations.  Assessment techniques can be 
modified to use more than one approach or a different approach than suggested in the checklist. The 
decision to use one or more techniques is conducted at the option of the evaluator. 
In order to ensure quality of SAPHIRE, the important SAPHIRE features must be identified.  Once these 
features are known, tests can be generated that would evaluate each feature.  The results of these tests are 
described in Appendix C.
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1.2 Summary of the Current SAPHIRE QA Process 
The SAPHIRE QA process encompasses several activities the INL uses to ensure quality throughout the 
development cycle.  These activities are illustrated in Figure 1 and are described in this report. 
Automated 
and manual 
testing
Software 
revision 
control
system
Requirements
documents
Software 
development 
standards
Software 
change
design forms
Testing,
verification, 
and validation 
documents
Software 
design and 
specification
documents
User testing, 
suggestions,
and feedback
SAPHIRE
Quality 
Assurance
Process
Figure 1.  SAPHIRE quality assurance process. 
As part of the overall QA process, the SAPHIRE TV&V process and results were previously documented 
in NUREG/CR-6688, “Testing, Verifying, and Validating SAPHIRE Versions 6.0 and 7.0 (Smith et al, 
2000).  Within that document, Section 1 explains that the version 6 and 7 TV&V departs from earlier 
V&V efforts (for versions 4 and 5) by focusing on the development and execution of a set of automated 
test scripts.  This TV&V process was expanded and automated so that the validity of the core 
functionality of SAPHIRE can be verified on an ongoing basis with each incremental release.  Note that 
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over the development cycle spanning from 1999 to the end of 2002 (four years), the INL released 18 
versions of SAPHIRE 6.x for an average of one incremental release every 2.7 months.  As the software 
matures, however, the release frequency tends to decrease. 
A released version of SAPHIRE represents an incremental version of the “current release” that is made 
generally available.  Note that at times, significant enhancements and additions were introduced as part of 
these released versions, so while existing bugs may be fixed, it is possible that new bugs are introduced 
via these new features.  Nonetheless, for each incremental version, the SAPHIRE software must pass an 
extensive automated test process to ensure that existing calculation features are not compromised.  
Definitions of the software release terms used by the SAPHIRE development team include: 
Beta The “beta” version of SAPHIRE is that numbered version (e.g., 8.x) that is 
currently under development at the INL.  This version is used to add new features 
and to make significant modifications to either the analysis or user interface 
portions of the software.  Since this version is in development, it is possible that 
features are incomplete or modification may leave the software in an unstable 
state.  In addition, the software documentation may not be available specific to 
this version of the software.  This version is not available for general release. 
Current Release The “current release” version of SAPHIRE is the most recent numbered version 
of the software that is “frozen.”  The term “frozen” indicates that the analysis and 
user interface portions of the software will not be modified, with the exception of 
needed changes related to programming errors or limitations.  Typically, the 
current release is the version that undergoes the largest amount of use, and 
consequently, has the highest degree of testing. 
N-1 Release The “N-1 release” version of SAPHIRE is the second-to-last released “frozen” 
version.
Note that for all versions of SAPHIRE, transfer of the software or related information (in electronic or 
hardcopy format) is prohibited unless prior approval is obtained since the software is subject to U.S. 
export control regulations. 
For the SAPHIRE QA, a variety of techniques is used to assure the integrity of the SAPHIRE software, 
including:
? Design changes 
? Tests
? Documentation 
? Version control 
? Bug fixes 
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1.2.1 Change Design and Testing Procedure 
Software developers follow the SAPHIRE Change Design and Testing Procedure when adding a new 
feature or revising an existing capability.  This procedure first describes the general approach to changes, 
and then describes processes that are more specific. The process stages include design and development, 
testing, and documentation.  The initial design effort corresponds to the size and complexity of the 
change. Developers use a cyclical prototyping design methodology as a means to clarify and refine the 
change. The prototyping process involves the requestor throughout development. The developers will 
interact with the requestor(s) both initially and throughout the design and development process to ensure 
the change accomplishes the expected goal.  
Changes and additions to the software vary from very small bug fixes to significant enhancements and 
new capabilities.  The complexity of a change or addition also varies by item.  Therefore, the developers 
use a graded approach to design.  They spend more time and effort on larger and/or more complex 
changes than on relatively simple items.  Areas of changes or bugs also dictate the level of effort.  For 
example, problems in cut set generating are much more important than problems in report areas.  
Enhancements to cut set generation are researched much more carefully than enhancements to reports. 
The frequency and formality of communications with the requestor also corresponds to the size and 
complexity of the change. This ensures that time and money is spent wisely.    
The SAPHIRE developers utilize a cyclical, or whirlpool, prototyping software development 
methodology.  The developers prepare prototypes of a proposed change or system, which can then be 
evaluated by both the developer and requestor, resulting in the development of a more refined prototype. 
This iteration process helps to clarify requirements, identify weak areas, and evolve and refine the design.  
Pictorially, the iteration process resembles a spiraling whirlpool or a target, where with each iteration, the 
cycle becomes smaller and tighter, until the final goal is achieved. 
The cyclical prototyping methodology requires a starting point, which entails a reasonably clear definition 
of the initial problem and a general solution.  When this has been achieved, the iterative development 
cycle begins. 
The first step in designing a change to SAPHIRE requires that the developers and requestors define and 
discuss the problem and propose a solution.  The developer should gain a broad understanding of the goal 
of the change, and the requestor should understand in general terms how the proposed solution will 
accomplish the goal.  
At this point in the process, the change will be summarized in a SAPHIRE Change Request Form (see 
Appendix B), where the problem will be summarized and categorized.  
Once a clear definition of the change has been identified, additional items are considered, including: 
? When applicable, define the necessary inputs and expected outputs.  
? Determine the approximate complexity and level of effort required to accomplish the task.  
? Consider how existing code functionality can be leveraged to help accomplish the task. 
? Consider potential effects on other parts of SAPHIRE. 
The next step is to prove the concept.  This means developing key internal functions as well as a 
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rudimentary interface to access and test those functions.  This step serves to test the feasibility of the 
solution, and helps the designers understand the problem.  The results of this step are used for further 
discussion between the developer and the requestor.  This is considered the first iteration of the prototype.  
Depending upon the results, the design may be modified and refined.  The prototype will be modified or 
rewritten to reflect the information learned.   
An iteration of the software should improve the functionality of the change to bring it closer to its goal.  
Successive passes, as the design and prototype stabilize, will incorporate more and more of the following 
items:  
? Additional supporting functions 
? Refined and more complete user interface 
? Integration into the SAPHIRE user interface 
? Auxiliary functions to facilitate ease of use 
Auxiliary functions are niceties that contribute to ease of use.  They vary according to the task, but may 
generally include such things as customizing, sorting, and/or saving data, generating reports, loading and 
extracting data between projects, toolbar short-cuts, and individual and bulk processing of data.  These 
types of auxiliary functions are added as time and budget permit.  Depending on the scope and 
complexity of the task, the requestor and the developer maintain contact throughout the development 
process.  Specifically, the requestor or a designated group of users will be given the opportunity to see, 
try, and comment upon prototypes at logical points. 
As a prototype is refined, it approaches a point where satisfies the solution requirements.  At this point, 
the SAPHIRE Change Design and Testing Checklist is completed.  Completing this checklist will help 
assure that a standard list of coding issues have been addressed. 
1.2.2 Acceptance Testing/Automated Testing 
Prior to any official SAPHIRE release of versions 6 and 7, the software is run through a series of 
automated tests.  The tests simulate user input to the computer through a test script, and results are 
captured and compared to expected results.  This ensures that given a static input PRA file, the risk or 
reliability results from SAPHIRE will be consistent from one release to the next. 
These tests were developed by first identifying the critical tasks performed in a PRA.  Then these tasks 
were mapped to the SAPHIRE functions that perform these tasks (Appendix C contains additional detail).
The critical functions were determined to include the following: 
? Fault tree analysis 
? Event tree and sequence analysis  
? End state analysis 
? Importance measures analysis 
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? Uncertainty analysis 
? Change sets 
? Data utility functions 
? GEM module functionality 
Next, a variety of models are selected, with varying degrees of size and complexity, based on suitability 
for adequately testing one or more critical functions.  These models mainly consist of actual PRA models 
developed by experienced analysts. 
Test scripts were developed to exercise essential SAPHIRE functions, with a quantitative emphasis. The 
test scripts mimic actions taken by an analyst, such as starting SAPHIRE and navigating the user interface 
by selecting menu options, clicking buttons and typing information.  Results are saved and compared 
against expected results.  A summary and a detailed report of the results of the tests are produced, so that 
an overview of the results can quickly be determined, and any failures (or successes) can be traced in 
more detail. 
A change is not considered complete until the results have been tested and found reasonable. Developers 
and key users will test to see that the change works as expected and is free of defects. Changes and new 
capabilities will not be released until the results are deemed satisfactory and correct.  When the change 
has been accepted, the SAPHIRE Change Form will be updated to document the completion of 
development. 
Prior to official release of a version, SAPHIRE's automated test suite must complete successfully (100% 
of all tests).  The success of the suite is a good indicator that the new change does not adversely affect 
other areas of the code. Rarely do changes and bug fixes change the acceptable results of the test.  On the 
unusual occasion when this happens, the target test results are modified to match the new accepted results 
for future runs.  The reasons for the results modification are documented and cleared by an authority on 
the subject matter. 
The SAPHIRE automated test suite was designed to verify core operations, such as generating current 
event data, and solving for cut sets.  When the tests produce expected results, the correctness and stability 
of SAPHIRE is validated. The tests exercise various features on assorted databases, with substantial 
overlap on key features to provide added confidence.  
The test suite is evaluated against significant changes and new features. New tests are developed to check 
a new feature when the developer and customer agree that it is appropriate. To develop a new test, a 
suitable test scenario with a database and validated correct answers must be determined. 
Each new version of SAPHIRE undergoes beta testing before its release.  Beta testing helps to ensure that 
the results produced by the new version are correct and that the software is user-friendly and functional.  
Beta testers are analysts experienced with PRA methods and terminology and typically are familiar with 
earlier versions of SAPHIRE. 
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In addition to the automated testing employed by the SAPHIRE TV&V, the development team utilizes a 
multi-faceted approach to testing.  This approach, illustrated in Figure 2, is comprised of three items: 
internal testing, external testing, and automated testing.  “Internal” testing (or developmental testing) 
includes those checks performed by the development team itself to ensure quality during the development 
process.  External testing are those evaluations performed by risk and reliability end-users using, in many 
cases, “real world” models.  Lastly, the automated testing are those tests that are used to ensure quality for 
each incremental SAPHIRE release and are described in NUREG/CR-6688 and this report.   
Figure 2. Types of testing used during the SAPHIRE development process. 
1.2.3 Documentation 
As changes to SAPHIRE are finalized, a description of the change is documented in several places.  The 
developers describe the change when they check-in the altered source code into the version control 
library.  Upon official release, the change is noted in a “read me” text file that is distributed with 
SAPHIRE.
SAPHIRE has an on-line user manual and technical reference manual.  Individual changes to the software 
are not necessarily reflected in this documentation with each release. Many changes are not applicable to 
this level of the documentation, but some changes and new features do apply.  Minor changes, such as 
wording changes in a screen shot, or removal of an obsolete feature, do not merit immediate inclusion; 
however, significant new features warrant timely addition. As priorities, time, and budget permit, when 
such new features are added to the software this documentation is revisited and updated. 
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1.2.4 Version Control 
The INL software developers use version control for both the formally released SAPHIRE versions, as 
well as for source code.  For each formal release of the software, the developers perform an acceptance 
test: the software must pass a suite of automated tests prior to official release. 
Each official release of SAPHIRE is assigned a unique version identifier.  The release is bundled into a 
standard installation package for easy and consistent set-up by individual users.  Included in the release is 
a list of bug fixes and new features for the current release, as well as a history of those items for past 
releases. Each formal release of SAPHIRE will have passed an acceptance test described in the 
Automated Testing section below. 
In addition to assignment of a unique version identifier for an official software release, each source code 
file is kept in a controlled library. (Source code is a collection of all the computer instructions written by 
developers to create the finished product.) The library is kept on a server, where back-ups are regularly 
made.  (Individual developers/programmers machines are periodically backed up as well.) 
The source code version control library requires that individual programmers "check-out" all files that 
they intend to modify.  Prior to "check-in", programmers must explain any changes made.  A record is 
kept of all changes, both as explained by the developer, and as individual copies of each version of a file.
At any time, the developer can retrieve past versions intact, if necessary. 
The SAPHIRE software program is continually modified, in response to user reported bugs and 
suggestions, and contractually specified enhancements.  The version control procedure described above 
ensures a methodical approach to tracking and releasing these changes. 
1.2.5 Approach to Bug Fixes and New Features 
As new features and bug fixes are made, the INL developers follow a standard approach to integrating 
these items into SAPHIRE.  For bug fixes, notes are taken from the reporting user describing the general 
context of the bug, as well as systematic actions to reproduce the bugs.  This bug information includes 
acquiring a copy of the user’s database, when necessary.  Reporting problems or suggesting features can 
be done using the SAPHIRE web site (http://saphire.inl.gov) through the change request function.  (See 
Appendix B for additional information) 
A software problem is classified and prioritized according to severity.  A bug is considered “minor” if it 
inconveniences the user, but a workaround exists to produce a correct answer. A bug is “major” if it 
prevents the user from obtaining the correct answer.  Problems in more commonly used features are 
considered a higher priority than those found in less used features.  User deadlines are also considered. 
Bug fixes are tested in the environment in which they were reported, as well as other places if possible 
side effects are suspected.  Sometimes, a release candidate is made available to the reporting user or group 
of users to ensure that the problem has been satisfactorily fixed.  Once a bug has been resolved, it is 
added to the list of changes for the next official version, which must pass the set of acceptance tests 
described in the next section. 
Software enhancements follow much the same approach as bug fixes.  Enhancements are prioritized and 
implemented, with intermediate testing by the developer and often by the requestor.  Once the process and 
results appear acceptable, the feature is added to the next official release. 
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2. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESSES 
2.1 Tests Used in the SAPHIRE TV&V 
The use of SAPHIRE in regulatory applications is extensive.  Therefore, SAPHIRE is tested through 
various processes.  Each new SAPHIRE version is beta tested to some degree before its release.  Beta 
testers are analysts experienced with PRA methods and terminology and are typically familiar with earlier 
versions of SAPHIRE.  The primary objective of the beta testing is to verify that the results produced by 
the new version are correct.  The secondary objective is to ensure the software is user-friendly and 
functional. In addition, INL personnel receive feedback from users around the world.  Hundreds of users 
rely on the calculations inherent in SAPHIRE for both risk and reliability calculations.   New SAPHIRE 
releases are tested extensively by (a) comparing them with PRA models and results of earlier versions and 
(b) by loading new PRAs and comparing them with expected results.  Given that different PRAs have 
been performed with different types of software, one can argue that SAPHIRE has been tested with an 
enormous number of test cases.  
The test procedure dictates how the mechanics of the testing process is to take place.  To perform the tests 
for the TV&V, test scripts and test databases to be used are stored on a network drive (at the INL) 
accessible by version control software.   The version control software tracks all changes by author and 
time.  Note that only one person is allowed to check out an item for modification at any one time.  These 
personal copies are stored on a local machine for development and testing.  Any completed changes are 
then submitted to the version control library with the name of the author, date, time, and a short 
description of the change.  The version control software stores and marks the changed copy as the newest 
version but retains the old versions for historical purposes. 
Individual test cases are designed to perform a specific analysis task, just as a SAPHIRE user might 
perform them.  Each test case consists of one or more scenarios (e.g., modifying data, generating cut sets). 
These scenarios focus on a particular piece or variation of the test case analysis task.  The complete set of 
tests and scenarios comprise the test suite, which is executed prior to release of each new version of 
SAPHIRE.
Prior to running the test suite, the latest, completed, and debugged scripts are checked out of the control 
library and compiled (by the testing software) into run-time form.  The compiled suite of tests, along with 
the compressed (.zip format) database files and SAPHIRE, are transferred to the test machine on which 
the tests are to be run (if any changes to the scripts have been made since the last test run).  This delivery 
mechanism allows the TV&V team to test SAPHIRE on a variety of computer platforms and operating 
systems.  Currently, SAPHIRE is supported for the Microsoft Windows operating systems of Windows 
98, Windows NT, Windows 2000, and Window XP.  The SAPHIRE software should function properly 
under derivatives of these operating systems (e.g., Windows ME), but at this time, the TV&V has not 
evaluated these other operating systems. 
The SAPHIRE test utilizes two different processes.  The first process is the development of test scripts or 
batch files, which are DOS commands that run pre-determined macros.  The macros are the second process 
that is used in the testing of the newly released versions of SAPHIRE.  Both of these processes along with a 
simple example will be presented. 
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The script of batch files are DOS commands that set up the test that will be performed.  There are two 
different types of scripts.  The first one shown below is used to execute multiple scripts at once.  This script 
file sets up the output by stating the date and time the test was ran along with what version of SAPHIRE was 
executed.  This script will be considered as the overall test script.  The individual lines are DOS commands 
that help create the output.  The first line is an input (i.e., %1 = typed in file name [detail]), which is a file 
that will be created storing all of the output information.  The second line is also a file that contains output 
information but is a summary report instead of a full detail report (i.e., %2 = typed in file name [summary]).  
The next group of lines is used to create the headers listed in the detail output report.  These lines stamp the 
output with the date and time of analysis along with the version of SAPHIRE being ran.  This information is 
placed in both the detail and summary report.  The last group of lines will now call the individual script files 
used for specific evaluations.  In the case shown the core damage frequency analysis will be performed using 
the database.  The line is a DOS line, which has the core_damage_freq script executed with the output 
information being stored in %1 (detail file output) and %2 (summary file output) and then which database 
this script is to be executed.  The individual script files will be discussed briefly since they are very similar. 
Overall Test Script 
if %1$==$ goto end 
if %2$==$ goto end 
c:
cd \Saphire7 
echo SAPHIRE/GEM Test Suite Summary Report > %2 
c:\Saphire7\qatools\datetime  "DATE & TIME :" %2 
c:\Saphire7\qatools\fversion  c:\Saphire7\tools\saphwin.exe %2 
echo>> %2 
echo> %1 
rem CDF analysis 
call scripts\core_damage_freq %1 %2 byrn_2qa 
etc.
The individual script files can be ran as stand-alone or via an overall test script.  The individual test scripts 
are similar except they execute the macros, which tell SAPHIRE what type of analysis is to be performed.  
The first two lines are the same for the individual test script as for the overall test script.  The third line, 
however, represents the database to be evaluated (%3 = database).  The next group of lines is used to create 
the folder, which the database will be placed and unzipped.  Then it executes SAPHIRE and calls the macro, 
which has the details of the specific analysis.  Once the macro has performed its specific analysis the results 
are dumped into the detail output file (%1) and summary output file (%2).  The last line is used to compile 
all of the outputs together in order to create one large detail file and one large summary file. 
Individual Test Script 
if %1$==$ goto end 
if %2$==$ goto end 
if %3$==$ goto end 
md c:\Saphire7\%3 
del c:\Saphire7\%3\*.* /q 
c:\Saphire7\qatools\unzip  o c:\Saphire7\database\%3.exe  d c:\Saphire7\%3 
copy c:\Saphire7\results\%3\qa*.rpt c:\Saphire7\%3 
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call c:\Saphire7\tools\saphwin.exe i386 PROJECT=c:\saphire7\%3\ 
MACRO=c:\saphire7\macros\Core_Damage_Freq_%3.mac
DETAIL=core_damage_freq_%3.rpt 
copy %1 + c:\Saphire7\%3\core_damage_freq_%3.rpt %1 
c:\Saphire7\qatools\lastline c:\Saphire7\%3 c:\Saphire7\%3\core_damage_freq_%3.rpt %2 
:end
The macros are used to perform specific analyses.  The following will provide a brief overview of the 
macros.  The macros utilize key words or verbs.  The verbs or key words are designed to execute certain 
functions within SAPHIRE to perform the specific analysis.  The following macro that will be discussed is 
used to solve the fault trees and event tree accident sequences of the specified project database.  The macro is 
core_damage_freq.mac.  The macro will be dissected in order for better understanding. 
First, the macro sets up the analysis.  The first line states that no prompt is required prior to starting the 
analysis (i.e., SAPHIRE will just move down to the execution process instead of waiting for a manual input). 
<initial prompt>no</initial prompt> 
This part is a comment bracket, which enables the analyst to identify the type of analysis this macro is going 
to perform and any other pertinent information. 
<comment>
TEST CASE NAME: Core Damage Frequency 
TEST SCRIPT FILE NAME: Core_Damage_Freq_PWR.mac 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF WHAT IS VERIFIED: 
This test case compares the sequence current case CDF against SAPHIRE version 6 base case 
results.  This test is not plant specific. 
NAME OF APPLICATION UNDER TEST:  SAPHIRE 7.0 
TEST CASE PURPOSE: 
REQUIREMENT(S) VERIFIED:   TBD 
TEST 01 Solve Fault Trees Fault Tree Probability Results 
TEST 02 Solve Sequences Core Damage Frequency Results 
TEST CASE ABSTRACT OF TECHNIQUES USED TO TEST THE FEATURE: 
The automated tests described herein are grouped to run consecutively. 
OTHER FILES REQUIRED TO RUN TEST CASE: None. 
</comment>
This part provides a description of the particular scenario that is going to be evaluated.  The scenario for this 
case is %P-01, where %P represents the particular database (i.e., Byrn_2qa) then provides the description of 
the test (i.e., Solve Fault Trees). 
<scenario>
  <start> 
    <name>%P 01</name> 
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    <description>Solve Fault Trees</description> 
  </start> 
</scenario>
The fault tree menu is now executed by using the key word or verb <fault tree>.  All of the fault trees are 
marked via the “*” operator, then they are solved at a truncation of 1.0E-16.  Once all of the fault trees have 
been solved, a base case update in the random calculation type is performed (key word <base case update>, 
<analysis>random</analysis>).  The results are then sent to a file with the name specified (i.e., 
ft_current_vs_base.rpt).  This output is then compared to a quality assured set of results to make sure this 
version of SAPHIRE that is being tested matches the results of a quality assured version of SAPHIRE.  Then 
the fault tree menu option is exited and the scenario is ended. 
<fault tree> 
  <unmark></unmark> 
  <mark mask>*</mark mask> 
  <solve> 
    <truncation>1.0E 16</truncation> 
  </solve> 
  <base case update> 
    <analysis>random</analysis> 
  </base case update> 
  <report> 
    <type>results</type> 
    <sub type>current base</sub type> 
    <file name>ft_current_vs_base.rpt</file name> 
  </report> 
  <compare file> 
    <input 1>ft_current_vs_base.rpt</input 1> 
    <input 2>qa_ft_current_vs_base.rpt</input 2> 
    <output>compare.rpt</output> 
  </compare file> 
  <report> 
    <type>results</type> 
    <sub type>current only</sub type> 
    <file name>ft_current_only.rpt</file name> 
  </report> 
  <compare file> 
    <input 1>ft_current_only.rpt</input 1> 
    <input 2>qa_ft_current_only.rpt</input 2> 
    <output>compare.rpt</output> 
  </compare file> 
</fault tree> 
<scenario><end></end></scenario>
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The next part of the macro provides a description of the particular scenario that is going to be evaluated.  The 
scenario for this case is %P-02, where %P represents the particular database then provides the description of 
the test (i.e., core damage frequency test). 
<scenario>
  <start> 
    <name>%P 02</name> 
    <description>Core Damage Frequency Test</description> 
  </start> 
</scenario>
This section tells SAPHIRE to go into the Change Set menu and make sure there are no change sets marked, 
then generate the basic event data.  Lastly, the process is completed using the </change set> key word.  
<change set> 
  <unmark></unmark> 
  <generate></generate> 
</change set> 
The last line of every macro is the “exit program” verb.  This command causes the macro to exit from 
SAPHIRE in order for another macro to be executed.   
<program exit></program exit> 
The above macro provided only a brief description of how the verbs or key words work in the macros.  
However, all of the other menus and actions that can be performed by SAPHIRE (i.e., end state evaluations, 
importance measures, GEM evaluations, etc) can be created using the same format.  In general, state the 
starting key word or verb (<end state>), then add the type of evaluation required (<solve> [i.e., gather cut 
sets]), then end the process by adding “/” to the verb (</end state>). 
By developing the key words or verbs into a SAPHIRE macro, the software can be tested for efficient and 
direct version verification.  The automated test suite uses embedded software hooks in the application-
programming interface (API) to allow the application code to run the test macros. The original test sequences 
(from SAPHIRE version 5) were translated into the macro language and then rerun on the current SAPHIRE 
software release to ensure results matched the pre-macro results.  The pre- and post-macro results were 
independently verified and validated by a PRA analyst.  
In addition to specific test scenario data, the user identification of the person running the test; the version of 
SAPHIRE being tested; and the version of the operating system are automatically recorded.  Final 
acceptance of any documentation, code, and test results is considered complete when all parties sign off on 
the completed change. 
The automated test software generates two documents: a summary report and a detail report, as it executes 
the tests. The report lists the test identification number, a description, and an overall pass/fail indicator.  A 
test is failed if even a single value in one sub-test is incorrect.  The detail report displays a more thorough 
description of the steps taken, the results obtained, the expected results, and deviations, if any.  As the 
code developers run the test suite, any discrepancies are noted and corrected prior to release of a new 
version.
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Automated testing activities are used to provide faster, better, and more efficient assessment of the 
SAPHIRE code.  Other test activities include the individual tests conducted by the developer of specific 
module(s).  Individual test cases are designed to perform a specific analysis task.  Each test case consists of 
one or more scenarios.  These scenarios focus on a particular variation of the test case analysis task.  A 
complete set of tests/scenarios comprise the test suite, which is run for each new version of SAPHIRE. 
Before test scripts are created, the salient features of the software to be tested must first be identified. 
Identification of the SAPHIRE features to be tested begins by outlining the major functions performed in a 
PRA.  These functions are then overlaid onto specific SAPHIRE features. Applicable PRA functions include 
cut set generation and quantification; uncertainty analysis; and importance measures.  Input is solicited and 
received from experienced PRA users to expand and refine the list.  From the list, SAPHIRE features are 
examined to determine importance and if they testable. 
Once the important SAPHIRE features are identified, tests were generated that would evaluate each feature 
are selected.  These tests may have more than one type of analysis approach, since it is possible within PRA 
(and SAPHIRE also) to solve some problems in more than one way.  For example, sequence cut sets could 
be determined by solving sequence logic explicitly or by combining pre-existing fault tree cut sets. 
For each test result in the suite (see Appendix C), the first line of the test result identifies the test ID and 
description along with the time at which the particular test was started.  This is illustrated below in the 
sample test result (e.g., SURRY-50-05).  After the identifier line, the steps processed by the test are shown.  
In the example below, the SURRY-50 sequences are solved using a truncation of 1E-9/yr and then recovery 
rules are applied.  The cut sets are run through a cut-set update.  Then, the test gathers end-state cut sets via 
the partition rules (again with 1E-9/yr truncation).  These end-state cut sets are updated.  Lastly, the results 
are compared against the stored “correct” results for the end states of AD5, AD6, AH1, and S2D1.  If the 
results match the “correct” results, a “pass” is indicated, otherwise a “failed” would be indicated.  Then, the 
time of test completion is recorded. 
SURRY-50-05 Scenario: Check End State Cut Sets started at 12:48:28 AM 
Sequences solved with prob cut off (1.0E-09) and with recovery 
Sequence cut sets updated 
End States gathered by cut set partition with prob cut off (1.0E-09) 
End State cut sets updated 
END STATE CUTSET RESULTS: 
AD5  pass 
AD6  pass 
AH1  pass 
S2D1  pass 
Scenario: Check End State Cut Sets completed at 12:50:05 AM 
While the tests and approved criteria address a large part of the calculation functionality within 
SAPHIRE, the tests do not cover 100% of SAPHIRE's capabilities.  For example, the current test suite did 
not encompass every possible way of modifying cut sets after generation.  Users can manipulate cut sets 
after generation (i.e., "post-processing") by manually editing them, using "recovery rules," using the 
"prune" option, and performing a cut set update.  However, the test suite does test the most commonly 
used mechanisms of performing tasks in SAPHIRE – these PRA tasks and their associated tests are listed 
in Table 1.  In this table, the test number, its name, the PRA area/function tested, the SAPHIRE option 
that is exercised, and the test model(s) that are used are listed. 
16
Table 1  Tests where specific PRA features are verified 
Test
Number
Test Name PRA Area SAPHIRE
option
Test
Models
Test-01
Test-02
Test-05
Test 06 
Test-07
Test-08
Test-09
Test-10
Test-11
Test-13
Test-14
Test-15
Test-16
Test-17
Test-18
Test-19
Test-20
Test-21
Test-23
Test-24
Test-25
Test-26
Test-27
Test-28
Test-29
Test-30
Test-31
Test-32
Test-34
Test-35
Test-36
Test-37
Test-38
Test-39
Test-40
Test-42
Test-43
Test-44
Test-45
Test-46
Test-47
Test-48
Test-49
Solve Fault Trees Fault Tree Probability Results. 
Solve Sequences Core Damage Frequency Results. 
Transient initiator with no other failures. 
Small LOCA initiator with no other failures. 
Steam Generator initiator with no other failures. 
Grid-related LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Plant-centered LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Severe Weather LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Extreme Severe Weather LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Project Uncertainty. 
Log Normal Distribution using MCS. 
Normal Distribution MCS. 
Beta Distribution MCS. 
Chi-squared Distribution MCS. 
Exponential Distribution MCS. 
Uniform Distribution MCS. 
Gamma Distribution MCS. 
Maximum Entropy Distribution MCS. 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution MCS. 
Constrained Non-informative Distribution MCS. 
Log Normal Distribution using LHS. 
Normal Distribution LHS. 
Beta Distribution LHS. 
Chi-squared Distribution LHS. 
Exponential Distribution LHS. 
Uniform Distribution LHS. 
Gamma Distribution LHS. 
Maximum Entropy Distribution LHS. 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution LHS. 
Constrained Non-informative Distribution LHS. 
Histogram Distribution MCS. 
Histogram Distribution LHS. 
Gather End States. 
End State Single/Group Uncertainty  MCS. 
End State Single/Group Uncertainty  LHS. 
Link Level 1 Event Trees (small event trees). 
Partition Sequence Cut Sets. 
Link PDS Event Trees (large event trees).. 
Fault Tree Importance Measures. 
Sequence Importance Measures. 
Sequence Group Importance Measures. 
End State Importance Measures. 
End State Group Importance Measures. 
Generate
current event 
data
No change set 
data
All
Test-03
Test 04
Test-12
Test-22
Test-33
Test-50
Condition Assessment - MFW unavailable for 72 hours. 
Emergency Diesel Generator out of Service for 3 months. 
Transient initiator with AFW failed. 
Dirichlet Distribution MCS. 
Dirichlet Distribution LHS. 
Single Change Set on Compound Event. 
Generate
current event 
data
Single changes DEMO,
SURRY-50
Test-50 Single Change Set on Compound Event Generate
current event 
data
Single changes Wolf 
Creek,
Peach 
Bottom
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Test
Number
Test Name PRA Area SAPHIRE Test
Modelsoption
Test-51 Change Set Processing- Class. 
Class change - all events, probability 0.1 
Class change - ?-MOV-1 events, probability 0.5  ( a subset ) 
Generate
current event 
data
Class changes DEMO, 
SURRY-50
Test-52 Change Set Processing-Marked Order 
    Marked change sets from scenarios 1, 2, 3 (marked in that 
order)
Generate
current event 
data
Marked order DEMO,
SURRY-50
Test-41 Cut Set Verification 
Cut Set Verification   Solve Sequences and Monte Carlo 
uncertainty calculations. 
Cut Set Verification   Solve Fault Trees, Sequences and end 
states. 
Fault tree cut 
set generation 
With flag sets COM-
PEAK, 
SURRY-
50,
SEQUOIA
Test-01
Test-41
Test-53
Solve Fault Trees Fault Tree Probability Results 
Cut Set Verification 
Basic Events Load / Extract  Fault Tree Load / Extract 
Fault Tree cut 
set generation 
Without flag 
sets 
SPAR, ** 
COM-
PEAK, 
SURRY-
50, CR3 
Test-41 Cut Set Verification Sequence cut 
set  Generation 
With flag sets All
Test-02
Test-13
Test-41
Test-42
Solve Sequences Core Damage Frequency Results 
Project Uncertainty 
Cut Set Verification 
Sequence cut 
set  Generation 
Without flag 
sets 
Multiple
Test-38
Test-41
Test-44
Gather End States 
Cut Set Verification 
Link PDS Event Trees (large event trees). 
Gather
sequence cut  
sets into end 
states 
By sequence BV2-5,
SURRY-
50,
COM-
PEAK, 
S_LERF 
Test-43 Partition Sequence Cut Sets. Gather
sequence cut  
sets into end 
states 
By Cut Set S_LERF 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Test-24
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Constrained Non-informative Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault  tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault  tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault  tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
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Test
Number
Test Name PRA Area SAPHIRE Test
Modelsoption
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Uncertainty of 
fault  tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-14
Test-21
Test-23
Test-36
Log Normal Distribution using MCS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
Histogram Distribution-MCS 
Uncertainty of 
fault  tree 
distributions
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
TSTU Test-25
Test-26
Test-27
Test-28
Test-29
Test-30
Test-31
Test-32
Test-33
Test-34
Test-35
Test-37
Log Normal Distribution using LHS 
Normal Distribution using LHS 
Beta Distribution LHS 
Chi-squared Distribution LHS 
Exponential Distribution LHS 
Uniform Distribution LHS 
Gamma Distribution LHS 
Maximum Entropy Distribution LHS 
Dirichlet Distribution LHS 
Seismic Log Normal Distribution LHS 
Constrained Non-informative Distribution LHS 
Histogram Distribution-LHS 
Uncertainty of 
fault  tree 
distributions
Latin
Hypercube 
sampling
Test-22
Test-24
Dirichlet Distribution MCS 
Constrained Non-informative Distribution MCS 
Sequence
uncertainty 
analysis 
Monte Carlo 
sampling
TSTU 
Test-38 Gather End States Gathering of 
End States 
BV2-5
Test-39 End State Single/Group Uncertainty MCS End State 
uncertainty 
analysis 
Monte Carlo 
sampling
BV2-5
BV2-5Test-40 End State Single/Group Uncertainty LHS  End State 
uncertainty 
analysis 
Latin
Hypercube 
sampling
Test-45 Fault Tree Importance Measures 
Fault Tree Fussell-Vesely Importance (ratio) 
Fault Tree Birnbaum Importance (Interval or difference) 
Fault Tree Uncertainty Importance 
Importance
measures  
Fault trees DEMO
Test-46 Sequence Importance Measures 
Sequence Fussell-Vesely Importance (ratio). 
Sequence Birnbaum Importance (interval or difference). 
Sequence Uncertainty Importance. 
Importance
measures 
Sequence DEMO
Test-47 Sequence Group  Importance Measures 
Sequence Group Fussell-Vesely Importance (ratio). 
Sequence Group Birnbaum Importance (interval or difference). 
Sequence Group Uncertainty Importance. 
Importance
measures 
Sequence Group BV2-5
Test-48 End State Importance Measures 
End State Fussell-Vesely Importance 
End State Birnbaum Importance 
End State Uncertainty Importance
Importance
measures 
End State HISNO, 
BV2-5
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Test-49 End State Group Importance Measures 
End State Group Fussell-Vesely Importance 
End State Group Birnbaum Importance 
End State Group Uncertainty Importance 
Importance
measures 
End State Group BV2-5
Test-41
Test-53
Cut Set Verification 
Basic Events Load / Extract  Fault Tree Load / Extract 
Cut Set Update Fault trees SURRY-
50, COM- 
 PEAK, 
CR3
Test-13
Test-41
Project Uncertainty 
Cut Set Verification 
Uncertainty 
analysis 
Test-41 Cut Set Verification Cut Set Update Fault trees SURRY-
50, COM- 
 PEAK, 
CR3
Test-41
Test-53
Cut Set Verification 
Basic Events Load / Extract  Fault Tree Load / Extract 
Fault tree cut 
set 
 Recovery 
Auto-recover
option
SURRY-
50,
COM-
PEAK, 
CR3
Test-02
Test-13
Test-41
Solve Sequences Core Damage Frequency Results 
Project Uncertainty 
Cut Set Verification 
Sequence cut 
set 
 Recovery 
Auto-recover
option
SURRY-
50,
COM-
PEAK
Test-43 Partition Sequence Cut Sets. Sequence cut 
set 
 Partitioning 
Batch apply 
option
S_LERF 
Test-42 Link Level 1 Event Trees (small event trees). Link Small 
event tree
(logic)
Linkage Rules S_LERF
Test-44 Link PDS Event Trees (large event trees). Link Large 
event tree  (cut 
sets) 
Create cut sets 
option
S_LERF 
Test-41 Cut Set Verification Fault Tree 
logic
Alpha-numeric
logic editor 
SURRY-
50,
COM-
PEAK
Test-41 Cut Set Verification Fault Tree 
logic
Graphical editor SURRY-
50,
COM-
PEAK, 
CR3
Test-54 Fault Tree Utilities: Auto Page/Solve 
Fault Tree Utilities: Cut Sets to End State 
Fault Tree 
Logic
Pager CR3
Test-42 Link Level 1 Event Trees (small event trees) Event tree 
logic
Graphical editor S_LERF 
All tests Project version 
controll
Version
Upgrade
All Models
Test-05
Test-06
Test-07
Test-08
Test-09
Test-10
Test-11
Test-12
Transient initiator with no other failures. 
Small LOCA initiator with no other failures. 
Steam Generator initiator with no other failures. 
Grid-related LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Plant-centered LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Severe Weather LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Extreme Severe Weather LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Transient initiator with AFW failed.
Initiating
Event
Assessments 
Delete All Models
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Test-05
Test-06
Test-07
Test-08
Test-09
Test-10
Test-11
Test-12
Transient initiator with no other failures. 
Small LOCA initiator with no other failures. 
Steam Generator initiator with no other failures. 
Grid-related LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Plant-centered LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Severe Weather LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Extreme Severe Weather LOOP initiator with no other failures. 
Transient initiator with AFW failed. 
Initiating
Event
Assessments 
Add All Models
Test 03 
Test-04
Condition Assessment - MFW unavailable for 72 hours 
Emergency Diesel Generator out of Service for 3 months 
Condition
Assessments 
Delete All Models
Test 03 
Test-04
Condition Assessment - MFW unavailable for 72 hours 
Emergency Diesel Generator out of Service for 3 months 
Condition
Assessments 
Add All Models
Test 03 
Test-04
Condition Assessment - MFW unavailable for 72 hours 
Emergency Diesel Generator out of Service for 3 months 
Condition
Assessments 
Add events to 
Assessment   
All Models 
Test-03
Test-04
Condition Assessment - MFW unavailable for 72 hours 
Emergency Diesel Generator out of Service for 3 months 
Condition
Assessments 
Process All Models 
Test-53 Basic Events Load / Extract  Fault Tree Load / Extract Fault Trees Load/Extract CR3
Test-53 Basic Events Load / Extract  Fault Tree Load / Extract Basic Events Load/Extract CR3
Test-54 Fault Tree Utilities: Auto Page/Solve 
Fault Tree Utilities: Cut Sets to End State 
Fault Trees Modify/Delete CR3
Test-55 Link Level 1 Event Trees (small event trees). 
Link Level 1 Event Trees: Solve w/ Flag Sets 
Solve Sequence Cut Sets w/ no Flags. 
Level 1 Event 
Tree Linking 
Linkage rules Wolf Creek 
302, Peach 
Bottom 
302,
SIMPLE-
FT 
Test-56 End-State Gathering End States End State 
Gathering
S_LERF 
(by rules),  
Beaver
Valley  (by 
names)
SIMPLE-
FT (PLUG-
IN-FT)
Test-57 Compound Event Plug ins Common cause 
module,
Utility module 
(i.e,. add, 
multiply),  
Load-capacity 
Fault Tree, 
Compound
Event Plug-in 
Test-58 Base Case Updates  Base Case 
Update
Base Case 
Update
All SPAR 
2Q, 3i 
models
SIMPLE-
FT 
Test-59 Calculation Types & N of M Gates 
Calculation Type True, N of M Gates 
Calculation Type False, N of M Gates 
Calculation Type Ignore, N of M Gates 
Calculation
types 
True, 1,3,5,7,
False, 1,3,5,7 
Ignore, 1,3,5,7 
Use of AND 
gates, then OR 
gates.
Test-60 Change Sets (place holder for a future test) Change Sets TBD
Test-61 Uncertainty analysis Uncertainty 
Distributions
TSTU, 
SUR40,
Wolf 
Creek,
Peach 
Bottom,  
SIMPLE-
FT
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Test-59 Calculation Types & N of M Gates 
            Calculation Type True, N of M gates 
Calculation Type False, N of M gates 
Calculation Type Ignore, N of M gates 
N of  M Gates Use of all inputs SIMPLE-
FT 
Test-59 Load Capacity Test 
Calculation Type True, N of M Gates 
Sequence
generation
Sequence
Generation
SIMPLE-
FT 
 (BE-
LOAD-
CAPACIT
Y)
Test-64 Common-cause failure Common
Cause Failures, 
Basic Events 
with change 
sets 
Common Cause 
Plug-ins
Wolf 
Creek,
Peach 
Bottom 3 
Test-65 Event Transformations (place holder for a future test) Basic Events, 
Sequence
Analysis 
Transformations TBD
Test-66 Wrong Results (a false positive to ensure the error flag for 
testing is functioning properly) 
Results
verification
Results
verification
DEMO
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2.2 QA Processes Used During the SAPHIRE Development 
2.2.1 Management 
The organizational structure of the SAPHIRE software development team influences and controls the 
software quality.  Roles and responsibilities within the organizational structure provide the development 
team with the freedom, flexibility and objectivity to evaluate and monitor the software quality as well as 
verify problem resolutions.  This structure enables the development team to tailor the maintenance and 
development activities, techniques, and methodologies for problem identification, reporting and resolution, 
testing, records retention, and configuration management. 
As SAPHIRE is currently in the maintenance phase of the software development lifecycle, software 
development procedures and supporting company standards are tailored to provide an appropriate level of 
quality, based upon a graded approach.  The graded approach integrates the following INL software 
management processes, standard, and procedures: 
? Software Management which identifies responsibilities, development methodologies, tools, and 
deliverables
? Quality Assurance activities to assure that the final software application meets the customer needs 
for quality and timeliness 
? Configuration Management and Change Control to monitor and uniquely identify baselines, changes 
that are requested, evaluated, approved, and tested, as well as backup and recovery actions 
? Software defect reporting and resolution for promptly addressing and resolving software errors 
? Maintenance of the software to remove latent errors (corrective maintenance), respond to new or 
revised requirements (preventive maintenance), and to adapt to software changes in the operating 
environment (adaptive maintenance) 
? Requirements and Design activities identified in contract documents 
? Testing activities, including automated test scripts and results identified in the SAPHIRE Test 
Verification & Validation (TV&V) plan.  These test procedures demonstrate the adherence to the 
requirements specified in the NRC forms. 
? Recording and implementing lessons learned 
2.2.2 Tasks and Responsibilities 
Management provides oversight activities as well as monthly status reports, draft reports, and a final report 
of the TV&V activities that are performed. The SAPHIRE project manager directs the roles, responsibilities, 
and tasks of the software development team.  Many of the quality management tasks and activities are 
conducted by product teams but are also reviewed by the project manager. 
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2.2.3 Documentation Purpose 
Documentation is traditionally developed and implemented to govern and provide quality assurance 
oversight of the requirements implementation, product design, code development and testing, verification, 
validation and maintenance of software.  As the SAPHIRE product is currently in a maintenance mode, the 
focus is primarily on providing enhancements and minor bug fixes.  As such, a graded approach is applied to 
provide a tailored method for document generation.  The development team obtains and retains change 
request information and documents lessons learned from previous development efforts.  Materials for new 
releases are developed to provide the end user with documents that identify the SAPHIRE product’s key 
functional area, the cut-solving algorithm. These documents provide the mechanism for the product team to 
perform internal quality reviews to ensure that all requirements for product enhancement and/or bug fixes 
have been implemented 
Documentation for specifications, such as a Requirements Specification and Detailed Design Specification, 
are not formally generated. Guidance and requests for new functionality are received from the NRC via an 
alternate mechanism. Contract documents have served as the driving documentation for specification of 
software requirements and have not required the need for formal documentation, primarily because the 
SAPHIRE product is now in maintenance mode. The contract documents have provided all the necessary 
guidance for implementing technical requirements for new features and bug fixes.  Typically, very little 
change to the detailed design of the software is affected by the addition of new features.  As such, all 
requirements and the code designs needed for implementing those requirements have been verified and 
validated through the use of the SAPHIRE automated testing process, the TV&V plan, and reviewed by the 
product team to provide and ensure the quality of the software release.  
User documentation includes the SAPHIRE Advanced Training Manual, the SAPHIRE User’s Manual, 
and the SAPHIRE Technical Reference Manual.  These manuals are updated as necessary to reflect 
changes in the software. 
Each release of SAPHIRE is bundled into a standard installation package for easy and consistent set-up by 
individual users.  Included in the release is a list of bug fixes and new features for the current release, as well 
as a history of those items for past releases.  
2.2.4 Testing, Verification, and Validation 
Quality is not “built-in” through the testing process, rather, quality is implemented throughout the lifecycle, 
beginning with the examination of the requirements, design, lessons learned from previous releases and 
reviews of software defect reports. 
A TV&V plan is developed to make sure that all requirements are implemented and those new features do 
not affect existing code functionality or design.  The TV&V is a consolidated document used for tracking the 
software development, testing and implementation and explicitly identifies the new features implemented for 
each release of the software as well as the automated test results, including regression tests, to ensure the 
software is complete, consistent, and correct.  The SAPHIRE product development team uses the TV&V to 
track, verify and validate requirements to ensure that all requirements are implemented and that all 
requirements are included in the automated test scripts and test results.  The TV&V plan is updated for each 
release of SAPHIRE by the development team by the performance of the following steps: 
? Prepare the TV&V plan 
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? Determine the areas required for testing, including regression testing 
? Develop new test cases based upon the development of a test model that includes the identification 
of available PRA obtained from the PRA database 
? TV&V model testing which encompasses the identification of base-case or nominal results for each 
test case 
? Documenting the test results, conclusions, and actions to correct any failures discovered during the 
automated testing process 
Prior to any official SAPHIRE release, the software is run through a series of automated test procedures.  
These tests run SAPHIRE through calculation exercises in order to compare the output to expected 
results.  This ensures that given a static input PRA file, the risk or reliability results from SAPHIRE will 
be consistent.  These tests are developed by initially identifying the critical tasks performed in a PRA. 
These tasks are then mapped to the SAPHIRE functions that perform these tasks.  The critical functions 
were determined to include the following: 
? Fault tree analysis 
? Event tree and sequence analysis  
? End state analysis 
? Importance measures analysis 
? Uncertainty analysis 
? Change sets 
? Data utility functions 
? Graphical evaluation module (GEM) functionality 
Models, with varying degrees of size and complexity, based on suitability for adequately testing one or 
more critical functions are then selected.  These models mainly consist of actual PRA models developed 
by experienced analysts.  Test scripts have been developed to exercise essential SAPHIRE functions, with 
a quantitative emphasis. New test scripts are developed for software enhancements, as needed. These test 
scripts mimic actions taken by an analyst, such as starting SAPHIRE and navigating the user interface by 
selecting menu options, clicking buttons and typing information.  Results are saved and compared against 
expected results.  A summary and a detailed report of the results of the tests are produced, so that an 
overview of the results can quickly be determined, and any failures (or successes) can be traced in more 
detail.
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2.2.5 Configuration Management and Control 
Quality assurance reviews configuration management and control processes to ensure that only authorized 
changes are made to the software.  All software modules that have been tested, documented, and approved 
for inclusion into the next release of the software are baselined.  The software/system database “librarian” 
controls the baselined source code. Copies of current build routines needed to construct the software, 
including all copies of all build routines used in all prior releases are also under the librarian control.
SAPHIRE uses a configuration management database as a control library for all information related to the 
development of software fixes, enhances, baselines, and subsequent releases.  Processes are in place to 
uniquely identify all components, modules, documentation, error reports, test suites, and test results through 
the establishment of a configuration control tracking number. The control library is kept on a server, where 
back-ups are regularly made.  (Individual developers/programmers machines are periodically backed up as 
well). Controls are in place to preclude multiple users from simultaneously accessing the same information.  
A source code version control library requires that individual programmers “check-out” all files that they 
intend to modify.  Prior to “check-in”, programmers must explain any changes made.  A record is kept of all 
changes, both as explained by the developer, and as individual copies of each version of a file.  At any time, 
the developer can retrieve past versions intact, if necessary.  The SAPHIRE software program is continually 
modified, in response to user reported bugs and suggestions, and contractually specified enhancements.  The 
version control procedure ensures a methodical approach to tracking and releasing these changes. 
Bug fixes and all supporting documentation are placed under configuration control.  Notes from the 
reporting user are obtained describing the general context of the bug, as well as step-by-step actions to 
reproduce the bugs.  This includes acquiring a copy of the user’s database, when necessary.  The bug is 
classified and prioritized according to severity.  A bug is considered “minor” if it inconveniences the user, 
but a workaround exists to produce a correct answer. A bug is “major” if it prevents the user from 
obtaining the correct answer.  Bugs found in more commonly used features are considered a higher 
priority than those found in less used features.  User deadlines are also considered. Bug fixes are tested in 
the environment in which they were reported, as well as other places if possible side effects are suspected.
Sometimes, a release candidate is made available to the reporting user or group of users to ensure that the 
problem has been satisfactorily fixed.  Once a bug has been resolved, it is added to the list of changes for 
the next official version, which must pass the set of acceptance tests described in the next section. 
Software enhancements and supporting requirements and documentation are also placed under 
configuration control.  Enhancements are prioritized and implemented, with intermediate testing by the 
developer and often by the requestor.  Once the process and results appear acceptable, the feature is added 
to the next official release.
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2.2.6 QA Standards, Practices, and Conventions 
The content of all QA standards, processes and procedures as well as documentation and coding conventions 
that are utilized are assessed to ensure the quality of the SAPHIRE code and supporting information used to 
construct the software release.  Quality functions include the reviews of the basic design and programming 
activities involved.  Information under the cognizance of the quality review includes, but is not limited to the 
following:
? Documentation standards 
? Design standards 
? Coding standards 
? Commenting standards 
? Testing standards 
To assess these items, QA reviews of software requirement specifications, design specifications, verification 
and validation plans, test documentation, and configuration management processes.  Methods used to assess 
these items include functional audits to ensure that all requirements are being implemented, physical audits 
to verify the consistency, completeness, and correctness of the software, software documentation and its 
readiness for release, and in-process audits to verify the consistency of the design. 
Many of these activities for SAPHIRE are conducted as identified in the TV&V plan.  This includes 
reviews of the contract documents, which provide the basic requirements for maintaining the SAPHIRE 
software.  As stated above, the development team conducts automated testing to assure that all 
requirements have been implemented correctly.  
27
28
3. CONCLUSIONS 
Product quality is a key component of SAPHIRE.  The SAPHIRE QA processes documented in the report 
provides the basis for setting quality objectives, progress, and the necessary framework for quality 
improvements.   The QA plan will evolve as the SAPHIRE product is enhanced to provide the end user with 
solutions to their technical problems and cost-effectively meet user expectations.  A majority of the changes 
within the SAPHIRE software occur because the end user has identified characteristics that provide “new 
potential,” thus resulting in SAPHIRE evolving as each new feature is discovered and implemented.  
Therefore, the majority of software maintenance comes about not because of deficiencies in the code, but 
because it was modified to embrace improved methods for risk and reliability assessment or to take 
advantage of changes in software development practices. 
SAPHIRE implements the key components needed to assure product quality.  Management enables the 
software development team to apply a graded approach to effectively tailor activities, techniques, and 
methodologies to provide for: 
? Configuration Management and Change Control 
? Software defect reporting 
? Software evolution and enhancement 
? Corrective, preventive, and adaptive maintenance 
? Deriving detailed requirements from the requirements and design direction obtained from contract 
documents. 
? Development of test cases and scenarios and their implementation into an automated test suite used 
for comprehensive testing to assure that requirements are validated 
? Recording and implementing lessons learned 
These factors provide the necessary assurance that quality is “built-in” to the SAPHIRE software, not “tested 
in.”  Quality must be planned, designed, implemented and verified before it can be validated through the 
testing process.  SAPHIRE will continue to be evaluated for quality as it evolves.  As such, this quality plan 
will also evolve as the needs and goals of the user and customer evolve to ensure the dimensions of quality 
are established and assessed. 
29
30
4. REFERENCES 
Bolander, T. W.  et al., (1994) Verification and Validation of the SAPHIRE Version 4.0 PRA Software 
Package, NUREG/CR-6145, February. 
Jones, J. L.  et al., (1995) Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations 
(SAPHIRE) Version 5.0 Verification and Validation (V&V) Manual, NUREG/CR-6116, February. 
Smith, C.L. et al, (2000) Testing, Verifying, and Validating SAPHIRE Versions 6.0 and 7.0, NUREG-
CR/6688, September. 
US NRC, (1993) Software Quality Assurance Program and Guidelines, NUREG/BR-0167, February. 
31
32
APPENDIX A 
SAPHIRE Salient Features List 
A-2
APPENDIX A – SAPHIRE Salient Features List 
In order to provide additional context to the complexity of a modern analysis code such as SAPHIRE (and 
its associated implications on testing) included is the list of salient features found in the software in Table 
A-1.
Table A-1  SAPHIRE Salient Features as a Function of the Version Number 
Item Feature Description Version  6.x Version  7.x 
A Cut Set Sequence Generation 
A.1 Rule based Fault Tree Linking X X
A.2 Linking of Small Tree Events X X
A.3 Linking of Large Tree Events X X
B Cut Set Generation for Fault Trees and Event Trees X X
C Cut Set Gathering for Sequence and End State Cut Sets X X
D Cut Set Partitioning via rules X X
E Cut Set Sorting 
E.1 By individual basic events X X
E.2 By probability X
E.3 By rules X
F Cut Set Post Processing (Recovery Rules) 
F.1 Event tree sequences X X
F.2 Fault trees X X
G Change Sets (modifying basic events for an analysis) 
G.1 Single event selection X X
G.2 Multiple event selection X X
G.3 Group event selection X X
G.4 Workspace area 
H Flag Sets (setting basic events to True of False)
H.1 Static (predefined) flag sets X X
H.2 Dynamic (rule based) flag sets X X
I Cut Set Quantification Methods 
I.1 Minimal Cut Set Upper bound (min-cut) X X
I.2 Min-Max (exact, using inclusion/exclusion principle X X
I.3 Rare Event X X
I.4 Split Fraction (Sequences only) X X
J Cut Set Analysis 
J.1 Cut set generation – cut sets solved, gathered, with truncation 
by size or probability, auto recovery 
X X
J.2 Cut set path tracing through logic model X X
J.3 Cut set comparison between two cases X X
J.4 Cut set comparison including probability changes 
J.5 Fault tree X X
J.6 Event tree sequences X X
J.7 End states X X
K Basic Events
K.1 Basic event correlation designation X X
A-3
Item Feature Description Version  6.x Version  7.x 
K.2 Basic event templates (reuse of a single event) X X
K.3 Compound events (plug in modules) X
K.3.1 Common-cause alpha-factor module X X
K.3.2 Common-cause alpha-factor (staggered) module X X
K.3.3 Common-cause beta-factor module X X
K.3.4 Common-cause multiple Greek letter module X X
K.3.5 Loss-of-offsite power frequency and recovery  module X
K.3.6 Time Series module X X
K.3.7 General purpose utility module X X
K.3.8 Load-capacity module X
K.3.9 Flow acceleration corrosion pipe module X X
K.3.10 User defined module 
K.4 Failure probability on demand X X
K.5 Failure probability to run X X
K.6 Value input (for any value) X
K.7 Failure probability to run w/ repair X X
K.8 Failure probability to run X X
K.9 House event True (Prob = 1.0) i.e. failed X X
K.10 House event False (Prob = 0.0) i.e. success X X
K.11 House event Ignore X X
K.12 Human Factor Event  X
K.13 Fault tree Min Cut Upper Bound Value X X
K.14 End State Min Cut Upper Bound Value X X
K.15 Seismic screening using user-specified ground acceleration 
value
X X
K.16 Seismic screening using hazard curve X X
L Importance Measures 
L.1 Fussell-Vesely importance measure X X
L.2 Birnbaum importance measure X X
L.3 Risk increase ratio importance measure X X
L.4 Risk reduction ratio importance measure X X
L.5 Risk increase interval importance measure X X
L.6 Risk reduction interval importance measure X X
L.7 Group importance measure X X
L.8 Uncertainty determination on importance measures X
M Model Creation
M.1 Seismic, fire and flooding transformation capability X X
M.2 Fault tree logic editor X X
M.3 Fault tree graphical editor X X
M.4 Event tree graphical editor X X
N Model Creation Load / Extract Data Models (MAR-D) 
N.1 All data and file types concurrently  X
N.2 Project files (primary descriptions, attributes, recovery rules, 
fault tree recovery rules, partition rules, primary text) 
X X
N.3 Project files (alternate description, alternate text) X
N.4 Attributes (primary attributes) X X
N.5 Attributes (all attributes, alternate attributes) X
A-4
Item Feature Description Version  6.x Version  7.x 
N.6 Basic event files (description, rate information, attributes, 
transformations) 
X X
N.7 Basic event files (alternate description, text, alternate text, 
compound events) 
X
N.8 Fault tree files (description, logic, graphics, cut sets, attributes, 
recovery rules, primary text, PID diagrams) 
X X
N.9 Fault tree files (alternate description, alternate text) X
N.10 Event tree files (description, graphics, logic, attributes, linking 
rules, recovery rules, partition, primary text) 
X X
N.11 Event tree files (alternate description, alternate Text) X
N.12 End state files (description, cut sets, textual information, 
primary text) 
X X
N.13 End state files (alternate description, alternate text) X
N.14 Sequence files (description, logic, cut sets, attributes, recovery 
rules, primary text) 
X X
N.15 Sequence files (partitions, alternate description, alternate text) X
N.16 Gate information files (description, attributes) X X
N.17 Gate information files (alternate description) X
N.18 Change Set files (description, information) X X
N.19 Change Set files (attributes, alternate description) X
N.20 Histogram files (description, information) X X
N.21 Histogram files (attributes, alternate description) X
N.22 Slice files (description, basic events, information) X X
N.23 Slice files (attributes, alternate description) X
O Model Creation Logic Gate Types (Max inputs 256 unless 
otherwise specified) 
O.1 AND X X
O.2 OR X X
O.3 N of M (Max N=98, Max M=99) X X
O.4 NAND (Not AND) X X
O.5 NOR (Not OR) X X
O.6 Transfer Gate X X
O.7 Left/right transfer marker X X
O.8 Undeveloped transfer X X
O.9 Inhibit gate X X
O.10 Basic event X X
O.11 Boxed basic event X X
O.12 Undeveloped basic event X X
O.13 Table of basic events X X
O.14 House event X X
O.15 Vertical/horizontal text box X X
P Uncertainty Calculations Monte Carlo and Latin Hyper 
Cube Sampling 
P.1 Normal distribution  X X
P.2 Lognormal distribution  X X
P.3 Beta distribution X X
P.4 Chi Squared distribution X X
P.5 Exponential distribution X X
A-5
Item Feature Description Version  6.x Version  7.x 
P.6 Uniform distribution X X
P.7 Constrained non-informative distribution  X X
P.8 Gamma distribution  X X
P.9 Maximum entropy distribution  X X
P.10 Dirichlet distribution X X
P.11 Seismic log normal analysis X X
P.12 Histogram distribution X X
P.13 Triangular distribution X
Q Uncertainty Calculations Parameter Settings 
Q.1 User defined seed, sample size, number of iterations X X
Q.2 Output intermediate values to file X X
Q.3 Output intermediate values in CSV format X
R General Support Features 
R.1 Sensitivity wizard X
R.2 Importance measures wizard X
R.3 Embedded macro capability X
R.4 Editing user information X
R.5 Page numbering control on graphic format X X
R.6 Conversion from alpha to graphic format X X
R.7 On-line context sensitive help X
R.8 Parallel processing (Linux only) X
R.9 Database recovery  X X
R.10 Designate output folder location X
R.11 Graphical export to windows metafiles X X
S General Support Features Report Generation
S.1 Project reports (summary, text, letter report, statistics, custom 
report)
X X
S.2 Project reports (fault tree recovery rules, sequence recovery 
rules, partition rules, uncertainty reports) 
X
S.3 Attributes (system, location, failure mode, basic  event, train 
type, custom reports) 
X X
S.4 Basic event (overview, probability, uncertainty,  seismic, 
transformation, cross reference, custom reports) 
X X
S.5 Basic event (compound event, developed events, 
 template events, text information) 
X
S.6 Fault tree (summary, logic, graphics, cut sets, importance 
measures, cross reference, custom reports) 
X X
S.7 Fault tree (recovery rules, text information) X
S.8 Event tree (logic, graphics, initiating events, cross reference, 
custom reports) 
X X
S. 9 Event tree (linkage rules, recovery rules, partition rules, text 
information) 
X
S.10 End state (summary, cut sets, importance measures, cross 
reference, custom reports) 
X X
S.11 End state (text information) X
S.12 Sequence (summary, logic, cut sets, importance  measures, 
custom reports) 
X X
S.13 Sequence (recovery rules, partition rules, text information) X
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S.14 Change Set (summary, class, single, text information, custom 
reports)
X
S.15 Flag Set (summary, flag set events, cross reference, text 
information, custom reports) 
X
S.16 Gate (cross reference, custom reports) X X
S.17 Histogram (summary, detailed, custom report) X X
S.18 Histogram (cross reference) X
S.19 Slice (summary, rule summary, slice events, slice rule, custom 
reports)
X
S.20 User Info/preferences X X
S.21 SPAR model report outputs X
T Report Format Types:
T.1 ASCII X X
T.2 RTF X
T.3 HTML X
U General Analysis Types 
U.1 Initiating Event Analysis (formerly GEM) X X
U.2 Condition Assessment Analysis (formerly GEM) X X
U.3 Accident Sequence Precursor X X
U.4 User Define Analysis types X X
V Application Program Interface  
V.1 Microsoft © Visual Basic Interface X X
V.2 Microsoft © Visual C\C++ Interface X X
V.3 Borland © Delphi Object Oriented Pascal X
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APPENDIX B – SAPHIRE QA Process Checklist and Change 
Forms
1. The project manager provides monthly reports, draft reports, and final TV&V report to the 
SAPHIRE sponsor of completed and pending maintenance tasks.   
OK
Discrepancy
Comments: 
N/A
2. The development team obtains and retains change request information.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
3. The development team obtains and reviews documented lessons learned from previous 
development efforts. 
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
4. Requirements derived from NRC Forms 173 and 189 are verified and validated for 
implementation into automated test scripts.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
5. NRC Forms 173 and 189 provide the requirements needed for software enhancements.  
Questions regarding any requirement specified by these forms are obtained from the 
appropriate NRC representative and the clarification of any requirement is documented and 
placed under configuration control. 
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
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6. Detailed requirements are derived from the higher-level requirements provided within the 
NRC forms.  
OK
Discrepancy
N/A
Comments:  
7. Detailed requirements and the code, test scripts, and test results are validated to ensure that 
all requirements were implemented and tested. 
OK
Discrepancy
N/A
Comments:  
8. The designated QA inspector reviews completed and pending tasks for compliance to 
requested enhancements or other maintenance activities, such as bug fixes.  
OK
Discrepancy
N/A
Comments:  
9. A TV&V document is developed and includes implemented requirements, new features, 
bug fixes and test results.
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
10. Prior to an official release, software is processed through a series of automated test scripts.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
11. Test scripts simulate typical user input.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
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12. Models suitable for testing one or more critical functions consist of actual PRA models.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
13. Test results are saved and compared against expected results.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
14. User documentation is updated upon completion of each new release.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
15. Software releases are bundled into a software installation package for use in set-up.
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
16. Software releases include list of bug fixes, new features, and historical information.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
17. Only authorized changes are made to the software release.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
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18. Software and supporting documentation is baselined and placed under configuration 
control.
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
19. The software librarian (or designee) places all baselined data, including builds generated 
during development, software fixes and enhancements, and software releases under 
configuration control via the configuration management database.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
20. The configuration management database precludes users from simultaneously accessing the 
same information.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
21. Prior to check in of information obtain from the configuration library database, users 
provide an explanation of any changes made.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
22. Step-by-step instructions obtained from end users reporting bugs/defects are used to 
reproduce the process that generated the bug. This information is placed under 
configuration control.
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
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23. Bugs are categorized by severity.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
24. Change requests and bug fixes are placed under configuration control.
OK
Discrepancy
Comments: 
N/A
25. Version control software tracks changes by author and time.  
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
26. The automated software process generates a summary report, detail report, test 
identification number, description, and pass/fail indicator. 
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
27. Generation of new test scripts include obtaining information solicited/received from 
experienced users and are examined to determine importance and testability. 
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
28. Test scripts are reviewed to ensure that requirements are tested adequately, completely, and 
correctly. (Good Business Practice) (Sample) 
OK
Discrepancy
Comments:  
N/A
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When a bug is reported, the user should gather and record the relevant information about the bug 
on the change request form (see below). General information should include bug reporter contact 
information and program version information.  
System environment information such as operating system and available memory and disk 
information should be collected as well, when it appears this information may be a factor into the 
error.
The problem should be described in sufficient detail as to allow the programmer to reproduce the 
error. The programmer may request that the bug reporter isolate the problem as much as possible.  
When necessary, a database should be provided with step by step instructions on how to 
reproduce the bug.
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As the change information is collected, the problem should be categorized as a major bug, minor 
bug, improvement, or new feature:   
? A major bug is defined as an error that stops the user from completing a task and/or 
adversely affects the core calculation ability of SAPHIRE.   
? A minor bug is defined as an error for which a work around is available, or something 
that affects less essential areas of SAPHIRE, such as a slight user interface malfunction. 
? The improvement category is defined as a change that will represent added convenient to 
the user. For this category, the change is not significant enough to be considered a new 
feature.  Examples of improvements are minor report enhancements, and replacing or 
adding smoother user interface options. 
? A new feature is defined as a significant additional capability to be added.  The scope of a 
new feature is greater than that of an improvement to an existing feature. Examples of 
new features include new calculation or uncertainty types, new wizards, and new plug-
ins.
The priority of a change will generally correlate with the category of the change.  Major bugs are 
generally the highest priority.  Minor bugs and suggested improvements are medium to low 
priority, depending on the pervasiveness of the problem.  Customers and project management 
together prioritize new features.
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APPENDIX C – SAPHIRE/GEM Test Suite Summary Report 
The tests that are in the SAPHIRE TV&V automated test suite (as of November, 2003) are listed 
in Table C-1.  The status of each test, on a pass/fail basis, is reported in this table.  Problems 
associated with failures, if any, are investigated and corrected prior to a release of the software. 
Table C-1  SAPHIRE TV&V Automated Tests 
Test
Number Test Description 
Pass or Fail 
Status
Test
Reference
Number
Test Case 
Name
BYRN-01 Solve Fault Trees PASSED TEST-01 [PBYRN-01] 
BYRN-02 Core Damage Frequency PASSED [PBYRN-02] 
BYRN-03 Condition AFW out of service for 72 
hours
PASSED TEST-03 [PBYRN-03] 
BYRN-04 Condition EDG out of service for 3 
months 
PASSED TEST-04 [PBYRN-04] 
BYRN-05 Transient - No other failures PASSED TEST-05 [PBYRN-05] 
BYRN-06 Small LOCA - No other failures PASSED TEST-06 [PBYRN-06] 
BYRN-07 SGTR - no other failures PASSED TEST-07 [PBYRN-07] 
BYRN-08 Grid-related LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-08 [PBYRN-08] 
BYRN-09 Plant-centered LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-09 [PBYRN-09] 
BYRN-10 Severe Weather LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-10 [PBYRN-10] 
BYRN-11 Extreme Severe Weather LOOP - no 
other failures 
PASSED TEST-11 [PBYRN-11] 
BYRN-12 Transient - AFW failed PASSED TEST-12 [PBYRN-12] 
PBOT-01 Solve Fault Trees PASSED TEST-01 [PPBOT-01] 
PBOT-02 Core Damage Frequency PASSED TEST-02 [PPBOT-02] 
PBOT-03 Condition HPCI out of service for 72 
hours
PASSED TEST-03 [PPBOT-03] 
PBOT-04 Condition EDG out of service for 3 
months 
PASSED TEST-04 [PPBOT-04] 
PBOT-05 Transient - No other failures PASSED TEST-05 [PPBOT-05] 
PBOT-06 Small LOCA - No other failures PASSED TEST-06 [PPBOT-06] 
PBOT-07 Grid-related LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-08 [PPBOT-07] 
PBOT-08 Plant-centered LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-09 [PPBOT-08] 
PBOT-09 Severe Weather LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-10 [PPBOT-09] 
PBOT-10 Extreme Severe Weather LOOP - no 
other failures 
PASSED TEST-11 [PPBOT-10] 
PBOT-11 Transient - HPCI failed PASSED TEST-12 [PPBOT-11] 
DRES-01 Solve Fault Trees PASSED TEST-01 [PDRES-01] 
DRES-02 Core Damage Frequency PASSED TEST-02 [PDRES-02] 
DRES-03 Condition HPCI out of service for 72 PASSED TEST-03 [PDRES-03] 
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Number Test Description 
Pass or Fail 
Status
Test
Reference
Number
Test Case 
Name
hours
DRES-04 Condition EDG out of service for 3 
months 
PASSED TEST-04 [PDRES-04] 
DRES-05 Transient - No other failures PASSED TEST-05 [PDRES-05] 
DRES-06 Small LOCA - No other failures PASSED TEST-06 [PDRES-06] 
DRES-07 Grid-related LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-08 [PDRES-07] 
DRES-08 Plant-centered LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-09 [PDRES-08] 
DRES-09 Severe Weather LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-10 [PDRES-09] 
DRES-10 Extreme Severe Weather LOOP - no 
other failures 
PASSED TEST-11 [PDRES-10] 
DRES-11 Transient - HPCI failed PASSED TEST-12 [PDRES-11] 
GGUL-01 Solve Fault Trees PASSED TEST-01 [PGGUL-01] 
GGUL-02 Core Damage Frequency PASSED TEST-02 [PGGUL-02] 
GGUL-03 Condition HPCI out of service for 72 
hrs
PASSED TEST-03 [PGGUL-03] 
GGUL-04 Condition EDG out of service for 3 
months 
PASSED TEST-04 [PGGUL-04] 
GGUL-05 Transient - No other failures PASSED TEST-05 [PGGUL-05] 
GGUL-06 Small LOCA - No other failures PASSED TEST-06 [PGGUL-06] 
GGUL-07 Grid-related LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-08  [PGGUL-07] 
GGUL-08 Plant-centered LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-09  [PGGUL-08] 
GGUL-09 Severe Weather LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-10  [PGGUL-09] 
GGUL-10 Extreme Severe Weather LOOP - no 
other failures 
PASSED TEST-11  [PGGUL-10] 
GGUL-11 Transient - HPCI failed PASSED TEST-12  [PGGUL-11] 
MIL3-01 Solve Fault Trees PASSED TEST-01  [PMIL3-01] 
MIL3-02 Core Damage Frequency PASSED TEST-02 [PMIL3-02] 
MIL3-03 Condition AFW out of service for 72 
hours
PASSED TEST-03  [PMIL3-03] 
MIL3-04 Condition EDG out of service for 3 
months 
PASSED TEST-04  [PMIL3-04] 
MIL3-05 Transient - No other failures PASSED TEST-05  [PMIL3-05] 
MIL3-06 Small LOCA - No other failures PASSED TEST-06  [PMIL3-06] 
MIL3-07 SGTR - no other failures PASSED TEST-07  [PMIL3-07] 
MIL3-08 Grid-related LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-08  [PMIL3-08] 
MIL3-09 Plant-centered LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-09  [PMIL3-09] 
MIL3-10 Severe Weather LOOP - no other PASSED TEST-10  [PMIL3-10] 
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Number
Test Case 
Name
failures
MIL3-11 Extreme Severe Weather LOOP - no 
other failures 
PASSED TEST-11  [PMIL3-11] 
MIL3-12 Transient - AFW failed PASSED TEST-12  [PMIL3-12] 
OCON-01 Solve Fault Trees PASSED TEST-01  [POCON-01]
OCON-02 Core Damage Frequency PASSED TEST-02  [POCON-02]
OCON-03 Condition EFW out of service for 72 
hours
PASSED TEST-03  [POCON-03]
OCON-04 Condition 3TC out of service for 3 
months 
PASSED TEST-04  [POCON-04]
OCON-05 Transient - No other failures PASSED TEST-05  [POCON-05]
OCON-06 Small LOCA - No other failures PASSED TEST-06  [POCON-06]
OCON-07 SGTR - no other failures PASSED TEST-07  [POCON-07]
OCON-08 Grid-related LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-08  [POCON-08]
OCON-09 Plant-centered LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-09  [POCON-09]
OCON-10 Severe Weather LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-10  [POCON-10]
OCON-11 Extreme Severe Weather LOOP - no 
other failures 
PASSED TEST-11  [POCON-11]
OCON-12 Transient - EFW failed PASSED TEST-12  [POCON-12]
OYST-01 Solve Fault Trees PASSED TEST-01  [POYST-01] 
OYST-02 Core Damage Frequency PASSED TEST-02 [POYST-02] 
OYST-03 Condition MFW out of service for 72 
hours
PASSED TEST-03  [POYST-03] 
OYST-04 Condition EDG out of service for 3 
months 
PASSED TEST-04  [POYST-04] 
OYST-05 Transient - No other failures PASSED TEST-05  [POYST-05] 
OYST-06 Small LOCA - No other failures PASSED TEST-06  [POYST-06] 
OYST-07 Grid-related LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-08  [POYST-07] 
OYST-08 Plant-centered LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-09  [POYST-08] 
OYST-09 Severe Weather LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-10  [POYST-09] 
OYST-10 Extreme Severe Weather LOOP - no 
other failures 
PASSED TEST-11  [POYST-10] 
OYST-11 Transient - MFW failed PASSED TEST-12  [POYST-11] 
SONG-01 Solve Fault Trees PASSED TEST-01  [PSONG-01] 
SONG-02 Core Damage Frequency PASSED TEST-02  [PSONG-02] 
SONG-03 Condition AFW out of service for 72 
hours
PASSED TEST-03  [PSONG-03] 
SONG-04 Condition EDG out of service for 3 
months 
PASSED TEST-04  [PSONG-04] 
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SONG-05 Transient - No other failures PASSED TEST-05  [PSONG-05] 
SONG-06 Small LOCA - No other failures PASSED TEST-06  [PSONG-06] 
SONG-07 SGTR - no other failures PASSED TEST-07  [PSONG-07] 
SONG-08 Grid-related LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-08  [PSONG-08] 
SONG-09 Plant-centered LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-09  [PSONG-09] 
SONG-10 Severe Weather LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-10  [PSONG-10] 
SONG-11 Extreme Severe Weather LOOP - no 
other failures 
PASSED TEST-11  [PSONG-11] 
SONG-12 Transient - AFW failed PASSED TEST-12  [PSONG-12] 
STL1-01 Solve Fault Trees PASSED TEST-01  [PSTL1-01] 
STL1-02 Core Damage Frequency PASSED TEST-02 [PSTL1-02] 
STL1-03 Condition AFW out of service for 72 
hours
PASSED TEST-03  [PSTL1-03] 
STL1-04 Condition EDG out of service for 3 
months 
PASSED TEST-04  [PSTL1-04] 
STL1-05 Transient - No other failures PASSED TEST-05  [PSTL1-05] 
STL1-06 Small LOCA - No other failures PASSED TEST-06  [PSTL1-06] 
STL1-07 SGTR - no other failures PASSED TEST-07  [PSTL1-07] 
STL1-08 Grid-related LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-08  [PSTL1-08] 
STL1-09 Plant-centered LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-09  [PSTL1-09] 
STL1-10 Severe Weather LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-10  [PSTL1-10] 
STL1-11 Extreme Severe Weather LOOP - no 
other failures 
PASSED TEST-11  [PSTL1-11] 
STL1-12 Transient - AFW failed PASSED TEST-12  [PSTL1-12] 
SURY-01 Solve Fault Trees PASSED TEST-01  [PSURY-01] 
SURY-02 Core Damage Frequency PASSED TEST-02 [PSURY-02] 
SURY-03 Condition AFW out of service for 72 
hours
PASSED TEST-03  [PSURY-03] 
SURY-04 Condition EDG out of service for 3 
months 
PASSED TEST-04  [PSURY-04] 
SURY-05 Transient - No other failures PASSED TEST-05  [PSURY-05] 
SURY-06 Small LOCA - No other failures PASSED TEST-06  [PSURY-06] 
SURY-07 SGTR - no other failures PASSED TEST-07 [PSURY-07] 
SURY-08 Grid-related LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-08  [PSURY-08] 
SURY-09 Plant-centered LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-09  [PSURY-09] 
SURY-10 Severe Weather LOOP - no other 
failures
PASSED TEST-10  [PSURY-10] 
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SURY-11 Extreme Severe Weather LOOP - no 
other failures 
PASSED TEST-11  [PSURY-11] 
SURY-12 Transient - AFW failed PASSED TEST-12  [PSURY-12] 
SUR40-01 Solve Sequence Cutsets PASSED TEST-02  [PSUR40-
01] 
SUR40-02 Project Uncertainty - Monte Carlo 
Method
PASSED TEST-13  [PSUR40-
02] 
TstU-01 Log Normal Distribution using MCS PASSED TEST-14  [PTstU-01] 
TstU-02 Normal Distribution using MCS PASSED TEST-15  [PTstU-02] 
TstU-03 Beta Distribution using MCS PASSED TEST-16  [PTstU-03] 
TstU-04 Chi-Squared Distribution using MCS PASSED TEST-17  [PTstU-04] 
TstU-05 Exponential Distribution using MCS PASSED TEST-18  [PTstU-05] 
TstU-06 Uniform Distribution using MCS PASSED TEST-19  [PTstU-06] 
TstU-07 Gamma Distribution using MCS PASSED TEST-20  [PTstU-07] 
TstU-08 Maximum Entropy Distribution 
using MCS 
PASSED TEST-21  [PTstU-08] 
TstU-09 Constrained Noninformative 
Distribution using MCS 
PASSED TEST-24  [PTstU-09] 
TstU-10 Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
using MCS 
PASSED TEST-23  [PTstU-10] 
TstU-11 Histogram Distribution using MCS PASSED TEST-36  [PTstU-11] 
TstU-12 Log Normal Distribution using LHS PASSED TEST-25  [PTstU-12] 
TstU-13 Normal Distribution using LHS PASSED TEST-26  [PTstU-13] 
TstU-14 Beta Distribution using LHS PASSED TEST-27  [PTstU-14] 
TstU-15 Chi-Squared Distribution using LHS PASSED TEST-28  [PTstU-15] 
TstU-16 Exponential Distribution using LHS PASSED TEST-29  [PTstU-16] 
TstU-17 Uniform Distribution using LHS PASSED TEST-30  [PTstU-17] 
TstU-18 Gamma Distribution using LHS PASSED TEST-31  [PTstU-18] 
TstU-19 Maximum Entropy Distribution 
using LHS 
PASSED TEST-32  [PTstU-19] 
TstU-20 Constrained Noninformative 
Distribution using LHS 
PASSED TEST-35  [PTstU-20] 
TstU-21 Seismic Log Normal Distribution 
using LHS 
PASSED TEST-34  [PTstU-21] 
TstU-22 Histogram Distribution using LHS PASSED TEST-37  [PTstU-22] 
TstU-23 Sq Constrained Noninformative 
Distribution using MCS 
PASSED TEST-24  [PTstU-23] 
TstU-24 Sq Dirichlet Distribution using MCS PASSED TEST-22  [PTstU-24] 
BV2-5-01 Gather End States PASSED TEST-38  [PBV2-5-01] 
BV2-5-02 End State Uncertainty using MCS PASSED TEST-39  [PBV2-5-02] 
BV2-5-03 End State Uncertainty using LHS PASSED TEST-40  [PBV2-5-03] 
BV2-5-10 End State Group Uncertainty using 
MCS
PASSED TEST-39  [PBV2-5-10] 
BV2-5-11 End State Group Uncertainty using 
LHS
PASSED TEST-40  [PBV2-5-11] 
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SURRY-
50-01
Check Sequence Cut Sets without 
Flag Sets 
PASSED TEST-41  [PSURRY-
50-01] 
SURRY-
50-02
Check Sequence Cut Sets with Flag 
Sets
PASSED TEST-41  [PSURRY-
50-02] 
SURRY-
50-03
Check Fault Tree Cut Sets (no flag 
sets in this db) 
PASSED TEST-41  [PSURRY-
50-03] 
SURRY-
50-04
Check Fault Tree Cut Sets without 
Flag Sets 
PASSED TEST-41  [PSURRY-
50-04] 
SURRY-
50-05
Check End State Cut Sets PASSED TEST-41  [PSURRY-
50-05] 
SURRY-
5O-06
Class Change - All Events PASSED TEST-51  [PSURRY-
5O-06] 
SURRY-
5O-07
Class Change - LPR-MOV-* Events PASSED TEST-51  [PSURRY-
5O-07] 
SURRY-
5O-08
Single Change - 1 Event PASSED TEST-51  [PSURRY-
5O-08] 
SURRY-
5O-09
Marked Change Sets PASSED TEST-52  [PSURRY-
5O-09] 
COM-
PEAK-01
Check Sequence Cut Sets without 
Flag Sets 
PASSED TEST-41  [PCOM-
PEAK-01] 
COM-
PEAK-02
Check Sequence Cut Sets with Flag 
Sets
PASSED TEST-41  [PCOM-
PEAK-02] 
COM-
PEAK-03
Check Fault Tree Cut Sets PASSED TEST-41  [PCOM-
PEAK-03] 
COM-
PEAK-04
Check Fault Tree Cut Sets without 
Flag Sets 
PASSED TEST-41  [PCOM-
PEAK-04] 
COM-
PEAK-05
Check End State Cut Sets PASSED TEST-41  [PCOM-
PEAK-05] 
S_LERF-
01
Link Level 1 Event Trees PASSED TEST-42  [PS_LERF-
01] 
S_LERF-
02
Partition Sequence Cut Sets PASSED TEST-43  [PS_LERF-
02] 
S_LERF-
03
Link PDS Trees PASSED TEST-44  [PS_LERF-
03] 
DEMO-01 Fault Tree Fussell-Vesely 
Importance 
PASSED TEST-45  [PDEMO-
01] 
DEMO-02 Fault Tree Birnbaum Importance PASSED TEST-45  [PDEMO-
02] 
DEMO-03 Fault Tree Uncertainty Importance PASSED TEST-45  [PDEMO-
03] 
DEMO-04 Sequence Fussell-Vesely Importance PASSED TEST-46  [PDEMO-
04] 
DEMO-05 Sequence Birnbaum Importance PASSED TEST-46  [PDEMO-
05] 
DEMO-06 Sequence Uncertainty Importance PASSED TEST-46  [PDEMO-
06] 
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DEMO-07 Sequence Fussell-Vesely Group 
Importance 
PASSED TEST-46  [PDEMO-
07] 
DEMO-08 Sequence Birnbaum Group 
Importance 
PASSED TEST-46  [PDEMO-
08] 
DEMO-09 Sequence Uncertainty Group 
Importance 
PASSED TEST-46  [PDEMO-
09] 
DEMO-10 Class Change - All Events PASSED TEST-51  [PDEMO-
10] 
DEMO-11 Class Change - ?-MOV-1 Events PASSED TEST-51  [PDEMO-
11] 
DEMO-12 Single Change - 1 Event PASSED TEST-51  [PDEMO-
12] 
DEMO-13 Marked Change Sets PASSED TEST-52  [PDEMO-
13] 
BV2-5-04 End State Fussell-Vesely Importance PASSED TEST-48  [PBV2-5-04] 
BV2-5-05 End State Birnbaum Importance PASSED TEST-48  [PBV2-5-05] 
BV2-5-06 End State Uncertainty Importance PASSED TEST-48  [PBV2-5-06] 
BV2-5-07 End State Fussell-Vesely Group 
Importance 
PASSED TEST-48  [PBV2-5-07] 
BV2-5-08 End State Birnbaum Group 
Importance 
PASSED TEST-48  [PBV2-5-08] 
BV2-5-09 End State Uncertainty Group 
Importance 
PASSED TEST-48  [PBV2-5-09] 
CR3-01 Solve Fault tree PASSED TEST-01  [PCR3-01] 
CR3-02 Extract,Delete,Load,Solve PASSED TEST-53  [PCR3-02] 
CR3-03 Auto page, Solve PASSED TEST-54  [PCR3-03] 
CR3-04 Save cutsets to end state PASSED TEST-54  [PCR3-04] 
SEQH_3I-
01
Check Sequence Cut Sets PASSED TEST-41  [PSEQH_3I-
01] 
Additional details of each test are shown below: 
Test-01 Solve Fault Trees.
Scenarios generate basic event data (with no change sets), solve (with cut set probability cutoff) and 
quantify fault tree minimal cut sets, and recovery rules.   The alternate case min cut upper bound, 
base case min cut upper bound, and cut set totals are verified for each fault tree
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Test-02 Core Damage Frequency.  
Scenarios generate basic event data (with no change sets), solve (with cut set probability cutoff) and 
quantify sequence minimal cut sets, and recovery rules.   The alternate case min cut upper bound, 
base case min cut upper bound, and cut set totals are verified for each sequence.
Test-03 Condition Assessment - Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) out of service for 72 hours.
Scenarios exercise all aspects of operational event analysis including removal of equipment from 
service and automated processing of all steps. These steps include basic event generation with 
change sets; and generation, quantification, and recovery of cut sets. The number of sequences; total 
conditional core damage probability (CCDP); total core damage probability (CDP); total 
importance; and CCDP, CDP, and importance for each sequence are verified.  
Test-04 Condition Assessment – Emergency Diesel Generator out of service for three months.
Scenarios exercise all aspects of operational event analysis including removal of equipment from 
service and automated processing of all steps. These steps include basic event generation with 
change sets; and generation, quantification, and recovery of cut sets. The number of sequences; total 
CCDP; total CDP; total importance; and CCDP, CDP, and importance for each sequence are 
verified.
Test-05 Initiating Event Assessment - Transient with no other failures.
Scenarios exercise the number of sequences; total CCDP; total CDP; total importance; and CCDP, 
CDP, and importance for each sequence are verified.  Automated steps performed for initiating 
event assessments include basic event generation with change sets; and generation, quantification, 
and recovery of cut sets.   
Test-06 Initiating Event Assessment –   Small Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) with no 
other failures.
Scenarios exercise the number of sequences; total CCDP; total CDP; total importance; and CCDP, 
CDP, and importance for each sequence are verified.  Automated steps performed for initiating 
event assessments include basic event generation with change sets; and generation, quantification, 
and recovery of cut sets. 
Test-07 Initiating Event Assessment – Steam Generator Tube Rupture with no other failures.
Scenarios exercise the number of sequences; total CCDP; total CDP; total importance; and CCDP, 
CDP, and importance for each sequence are verified.  Automated steps performed for initiating 
event assessments include basic event generation with change sets; and generation, quantification, 
and recovery of cut sets. 
Test-08 Initiating Event Assessment –  Grid-Related Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) with no 
other failures 
Scenarios exercise the number of sequences; total CCDP; total CDP; total importance; and CCDP, 
CDP, and importance for each sequence are verified.  Automated steps performed for initiating 
event assessments include basic event generation with change sets; and generation, quantification, 
and recovery of cut sets. 
Test-09 Initiating Event Assessment - Plant-Centered LOOP with no other failures
 Scenarios exercise the number of sequences; total CCDP; total CDP; total importance; and CCDP, 
CDP, and importance for each sequence are verified.  Automated steps performed for initiating 
event assessments include basic event generation with change sets; and generation, quantification, 
and recovery of cut sets. 
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Test-10 Initiating Event Assessment - Severe Weather LOOP with no other failures 
Scenarios exercise the number of sequences; total CCDP; total CDP; total importance; and CCDP, 
CDP, and importance for each sequence are verified.  Automated steps performed for initiating 
event assessments include basic event generation with change sets; and generation, quantification, 
and recovery of cut sets. 
Test-11 Initiating Event Assessment – Extreme Severe Weather LOOP with no other failures 
Scenarios exercise the number of sequences; total CCDP; total CDP; total importance; and CCDP, 
CDP, and importance for each sequence are verified.  Automated steps performed for initiating 
event assessments include basic event generation with change sets; and generation, quantification, 
and recovery of cut sets. 
Test-12 Initiating Event Assessment - Transient with AFW Failed 
Scenarios exercise the number of sequences; total CCDP; total CDP; total importance; and CCDP, 
CDP, and importance for each sequence are verified.  Automated steps performed for initiating 
event assessments include basic event generation with change sets; and generation, quantification, 
and recovery of cut sets. 
Test-13 Dominant Sequence Frequencies and Core Damage Frequency Uncertainty 
This scenario continues the tracking with an automated test script.  Cut sets generated with cut set 
probability cutoff and cut set size cutoff.  Recovery rules are applied without cutoff.  Cut set update 
performed with no truncation. Project level Monte Carlo uncertainty performed on results using 
5000 samples.  
Test-14  Fault Tree Uncertainty - Monte Carlo Method/Log Normal Distribution 
This scenario consists of six variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the log normal distribution type.  The six variations use fault trees that consists of an 
OR gate with a single basic event as its input. Each variation uses differing basic event nominal 
probabilities and error factors.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard 
deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples (simulated values) and a random number seed 
of 4,321 for each test.
Test-15 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Monte Carlo Method/Normal Distribution
This scenario consists of variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation technique 
for the normal distribution type.  Two fault trees are used that consist of an OR gate with a single 
basic event as its input, with differing basic event nominal probabilities and standard deviation 
values.  Fault tree combinations of five sample sizes and two seed values are used for a total of ten 
tests for each tree.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results 
are verified.
Test-16 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Monte Carlo Method/Beta Distribution
This scenario consists of ten variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the beta distribution type.  The ten variations use fault trees that consists of an OR gate 
with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic event nominal probabilities 
and uncertainty values.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation 
results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a seed of 4,321 for each test.
Test-17 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Monte Carlo Method/Chi Squared Distribution
This scenario consists of twelve variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the chi-square distribution type.  For ten of the variations, ten fault trees are used that 
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consists of an OR gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each basic event has a different 
nominal probability and uncertainty value (degrees of freedom).  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 
95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a seed of 
4,321 for each test.   For the other variations two fault trees are used that consist of an OR gate with 
a single basic event as its input with differing basic event nominal probabilities and uncertainty 
values.  For each of these fault trees, four different sample sizes and seed of 4,321 are used.  The 5th 
percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified.
Test-18 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Monte Carlo Method/Exponential Distribution
This scenario consists of eight variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the exponential distribution type.  The eight variations use fault trees that consists of 
an OR gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic event nominal 
probabilities.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are 
verified based on 5,000 samples and a seed of 4,321 for each test. 
Test-19 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Monte Carlo Method/Uniform Distribution
This scenario consists of four variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the uniform distribution type.  The four variations use fault trees that consists of an OR 
gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic event nominal 
probabilities and upper end uncertainty values.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, 
and standard deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a seed of 4,321 for each test.   
Test-20 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Monte Carlo Method/Gamma Distribution
This scenario consists of six variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the gamma distribution type.  The six variations use fault trees that consists of an OR 
gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic event nominal 
probabilities and uncertainty values (r).  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and 
standard deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a seed of 4,321 for each test.   
Test-21 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Monte Carlo Method/Maximum Entropy Distribution
This scenario consists of seven variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the maximum entropy distribution type.  The seven variations use fault trees that 
consists of an OR gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic 
event nominal probabilities, upper end, and lower end uncertainty values.  The 5th percentile, 50th 
percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a 
seed of 4,321 for each test. 
Test-22 Sequence Uncertainty - Monte Carlo Method / Dirichlet Distribution 
This test scenario consists of four variations that test uncertainty analyses using the Monte Carlo 
simulation technique for the Dirichlet distribution type.  The first three variations each use a three-
branch event tree with differing failure probabilities and parameter values.  The fourth variation uses 
a 121-branch event tree.  Change sets are used to correlate the basic events.  The 5th percentile, 50th 
percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified.
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Test-23 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Monte Carlo Method/Seismic Distribution 
This scenario consists of four variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the seismic distribution type.  The four variations use fault trees that consists of an OR 
gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic event median failure 
acceleration, screening G-level, Beta-R and Beta-U values.  Uncertainty analysis is performed using 
the Seismic analysis type.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard 
deviation results are verified based on 10,000 samples and a seed of 4,321 for each test.   
Test-24 Fault Tree and Sequence Uncertainty –  Monte Carlo Method/Constrained 
Noninformative Distribution 
This scenario consists of five variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques for the Constrained Noninformative distribution type.  The three variations involving 
fault trees use fault trees that consists of an OR gate with a single basic event as its input with 
differing basic event nominal probabilities.  The two variations involving sequences use event trees 
with differing initiating event nominal frequencies.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th 
percentile, and standard deviation results are verified based on 10,000 simulated values for each test.   
Test-25 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Latin Hypercube Method/Log Normal Distribution
This scenario consists of six variations that test uncertainty using the Latin Hypercube simulation 
technique for the log normal distribution type.  The six variations use fault trees that consists of an 
OR gate with a single basic event as its input. Each variation uses differing basic event nominal 
probabilities and error factors.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard 
deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples (simulated values) and a random number seed 
of 4,321 for each test.
Test-26 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Latin Hypercube Method/Normal Distribution 
This scenario consists of variations that test uncertainty using the Latin Hypercube simulation 
technique for the normal distribution type.  Two fault trees are used that consist of an OR gate with a 
single basic event as its input, with differing basic event nominal probabilities and standard 
deviation values.  Fault tree combinations of five sample sizes and two seed values are used for a 
total of ten tests for each tree.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard 
deviation results are verified. 
Test-27 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Latin Hypercube Method/Beta Distribution
This scenario consists of ten variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the beta distribution type.  The ten variations use fault trees that consists of an OR gate 
with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic event nominal probabilities 
and uncertainty values.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation 
results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a seed of 4,321 for each test.
Test-28 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Latin Hypercube Method/Chi Squared Distribution.
This scenario consists of twelve variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the chi-square distribution type.  For ten of the variations, ten fault trees are used that 
consists of an OR gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each basic event has a different 
nominal probability and uncertainty value (degrees of freedom).  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 
95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a seed of 
4,321 for each test.   For the other variations two fault trees are used that consist of an OR gate with 
a single basic event as its input with differing basic event nominal probabilities and uncertainty 
values.  For each of these fault trees, four different sample sizes and seed of 4,321 are used.  The 5th 
percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified.
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Test-29 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Latin Hypercube Method/Exponential Distribution
This scenario consists of eight variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the exponential distribution type.  The eight variations use fault trees that consists of 
an OR gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic event nominal 
probabilities.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are 
verified based on 5,000 samples and a seed of 4,321 for each test 
Test-30 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Latin Hypercube Method/Uniform Distribution 
This scenario consists of four variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the uniform distribution type.  The four variations use fault trees that consists of an OR 
gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic event nominal 
probabilities and upper end uncertainty values.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, 
and standard deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a seed of 4,321 for each test.   
Test-31 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Latin Hypercube Method/Gamma Distribution
This scenario consists of six variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the gamma distribution type.  The six variations use fault trees that consists of an OR 
gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic event nominal 
probabilities and uncertainty values (r).  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and 
standard deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a seed of 4,321 for each test.   
Test-32 Sequence Uncertainty - Latin Hypercube Method/Maximum Entropy Distribution
This scenario consists of seven variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the maximum entropy distribution type.  The seven variations use fault trees that 
consists of an OR gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic 
event nominal probabilities, upper end, and lower end uncertainty values.  The 5th percentile, 50th 
percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a 
seed of 4,321 for each test. 
Test-33 Sequence Uncertainty - Latin Hypercube Method/Dirichlet Distribution
This test scenario consists of four variations that test uncertainty analyses using the Monte Carlo 
simulation technique for the Dirichlet distribution type.  The first three variations each use a three-
branch event tree with differing failure probabilities and parameter values.  The fourth variation uses 
a 121-branch event tree.  Change sets are used to correlate the basic events.  The 5th percentile, 50th 
percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified.  Since this distribution type 
was not available in version 5, version 6 results have been inspected for acceptance and are used for 
comparison against subsequent incremental releases. 
Test-34 Fault Tree Uncertainty - Latin Hypercube Method/Seismic Distribution
This scenario consists of four variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the seismic distribution type.  The four variations use fault trees that consists of an OR 
gate with a single basic event as its input.  Each variation uses differing basic event median failure 
acceleration, screening G-level, Beta-R and Beta-U values.  Uncertainty analysis is performed using 
the Seismic analysis type.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th percentile, and standard 
deviation results are verified based on 10,000 samples and a seed of 4,321 for each test.   
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Test-35 Fault Tree and Sequence Uncertainty – Latin Hypercube Method / Constrained 
Noninformative Distribution
This scenario consists of five variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques for the Constrained Noninformative distribution type.  The three variations involving 
fault trees use fault trees that consists of an OR gate with a single basic event as its input with 
differing basic event nominal probabilities.  The two variations involving sequences use event trees 
with differing initiating event nominal frequencies.  The 5th percentile, 50th percentile, 95th 
percentile, and standard deviation results are verified based on 10,000 simulated values for each test. 
Test-36 Fault Tree Uncertainty – Monte Carlo Method / Histogram Distribution
This scenario consists of four variations that test uncertainty using the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique for the histogram distribution type.  The four variations use fault trees that consists of an 
OR gate with a single basic event as its input. Each variation uses differing basic event nominal 
probabilities and histograms (of percentage, area, and range types).  The 5th percentile, 50th 
percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a 
seed of 4,321 for each test.
Test-37 Fault Tree Uncertainty – Latin Hypercube Method / Histogram Distribution 
This scenario consists of four variations that test uncertainty using the Latin Hypercube simulation 
technique for the histogram distribution type.  The four variations use fault trees that consists of an 
OR gate with a single basic event as its input. Each variation uses differing basic event nominal 
probabilities and histograms (of percentage, area, and range types).  The 5th percentile, 50th 
percentile, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified based on 5,000 samples and a 
seed of 4,321 for each test.
Test-38  Gathering of  End States
This scenario generates basic event data (with no change sets) and gathers the end states (without cut 
set probability cutoff, by sequence end state).  The alternate case min-cut upper bound and the 
number of cut sets are verified for each end state.   
Test-39 End State Uncertainty – Monte Carlo Method
These scenarios perform multiple event sampling on all sequences that belong to a particular end 
state (single uncertainty), as well as the collection of all end states (group uncertainty).  The mean, 
5th percentile, median, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified based on 3,000 
simulated values for each test. 
Test-40 End State Uncertainty – Latin Hypercube Method
These scenarios perform multiple event sampling on all sequences that belong to a particular end 
state (single uncertainty), as well as the collection of all end states (group uncertainty) .  The mean, 
5th percentile, median, 95th percentile, and standard deviation results are verified based on 3,000 
simulated values for each test. 
Test-41 Cut Set Verification
This test case consists of scenarios that compare cut sets from selected fault trees, sequences, and 
end states.  The cut set frequency, percent contribution to the total, and basic events in the cut set are 
verified.  Cut sets are solved and /or /gathered with truncation, auto-recovered, and updated. 
Sequences and fault trees are solved with and without their default flag sets.  Also, fault tree editing 
is briefly tested.  This is done by opening the alphanumeric logic editor, saving and converting logic 
to graphics, then pulling up the graphical editor and saving the graphics.  This test does not test 
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specific editing features but it does verify that the original logic is correctly loaded and saved.  
Failure of the logic to be preserved correctly would be detected with incorrect cut set results. 
Test-42 Link Small Event Tree
This scenario uses the Surry Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) Level 2/3 model (S_LERF) to 
link event trees using the small event tree methodology. Prior to link, each event tree is loaded into 
the graphical editor and saved to ensure that the correct logic is preserved. The sequences are then 
solved with cutoff.  The alternate case min cut upper bound and number of cut sets is verified for 
each Level 1 sequence.
Test-43 Partition Sequence Cut Sets
This scenario applies event tree partition rules to the sequences generated in scenario reference 
number Test-42.  These partition rules assign Plant Damage States (PDSs) to all sequences with cut 
sets.  These end states are then gathered by cut set partition.  The alternate case min cut upper bound 
and number of cut sets is verified for each PDS. 
Test-44 Link Large Event Tree
This scenario uses the results from scenario reference number Test-43.  The PDS event trees created 
by the partition rules are linked using the large event tree methodology and create sequence logic cut 
sets.  The LERF end states are then gathered by sequence end state and re-quantified using the Rare 
Event approximation.  The alternate case min-cut upper bound and number of cut sets are verified 
for each LERF end state.
Test-45 Fault Tree Importance Measures 
This test case consists of scenarios that test importance measures calculations with fault trees for 
each of the importance measures: ratio, difference, and uncertainty.  For each event, the name, 
number of occurrences, probability, Fussell-Vesely (or Birnbaum or uncertainty importance), risk 
reduction ratio (or difference), risk increase ratio (or difference) results are verified.   
Test-46 Sequence Importance Measures
This test case consists of scenarios that test Sequence importance measures calculations for each of 
the importance measures: ratio, difference, and uncertainty.  For each event, the name, number of 
occurrences, probability, Fussell-Vesely (or Birnbaum or uncertainty importance), risk reduction 
ratio (or difference), risk increase ratio (or difference) results are verified. 
Test-47 Sequence Group Importance Measures 
This test case consists of scenarios that test Sequence Group importance measures calculations for 
each of the importance measures: ratio, difference, and uncertainty.  For each event, the name, 
number of occurrences, probability, Fussell-Vesely (or Birnbaum or uncertainty importance), risk 
reduction ratio (or difference), risk increase ratio (or difference) results are verified. 
Test-48 End State Importance Measures
This test case consists of scenarios that test End State importance measure calculations for each of 
the importance measures: ratio, difference, and uncertainty.  For each event, the name, number of 
occurrences, probability, Fussell-Vesely (or Birnbaum or uncertainty importance), risk reduction 
ratio (or difference), risk increase ratio (or difference) results are verified.   
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Test-49 End State Group Importance
This test case consists of scenarios that test End State Group importance measures calculations for 
each of the importance measures: ratio, difference, and uncertainty.  For each event, the name, 
number of occurrences, probability, Fussell-Vesely (or Birnbaum or uncertainty importance), risk 
reduction ratio (or difference), risk increase ratio (or difference) results are verified. 
Test-50 Change Set Processing- Single
This test case consists of scenarios that test the effects of basic event changes, via change sets, on 
sequence cut set results.  In these scenarios, single basic event changes are made in a change set.  
The change set is then marked and the basic event data is generated.  An affected sequence is then 
selected and cut set results are verified.
Test-51 Change Set Processing- Class 
This test case consists of scenarios that test the effects of basic event changes, via change sets, on 
sequence cut set results.  In these scenarios, class basic event changes are made in a change set.  The 
change set is then marked and the basic event data is generated.  An affected sequence is then 
selected and cut set results are verified.
Test-52 Change Set Processing - Marked Order
This test case consists of scenarios that test the effects of basic event changes, via change sets, on 
sequence cut set results.  In these scenarios, the change sets created in Test-50 and Test-51 are used.
Multiple change sets are marked and the basic event data is generated.  An affected sequence is then 
selected and cut set results are validated.  This test verifies that the changed basic events are 
processed correctly based on the marked order of the change sets.  
Test-53 Extract, Delete, Load, Solve - Fault Trees and Basic Events
This test consists of scenarios that exercise utility functions associated with the database for loading 
plant models, end state data, or other information to be analyzed with the tool set.   
Test-54 Fault Tree Utility Functions –Auto page, Solve, Save Cut Sets to End States 
SAPHIRE provides several utilities maintain fault trees. These tests verify that the use of these 
features does not introduce errors into the database.   The auto-page scenario breaks up a large fault 
tree into manageable smaller fault trees with transfer information. An auto-page is performed on a 
large fault tree, and then the modified tree is solved to verify the cut set results are not altered with 
the paging operation. Another scenario copies a fault tree cut sets to an end state, and then verifies 
that the cut sets in the end state match the cut sets in the fault tree.
Test 55 – Event Tree Linking (including rules) 
The event tree linking rules are tested using several different databases.  The databases are the Surry 
LERF model, Wolf Creek Revision 302, and Peach Bottom Revision 302.  The Surry LERF model 
links the Level 1 event tree sequences together prior to solving the accident sequences, then 
performs an end state gather.  The end states then become Level 2 event trees, which are linked 
together using the large event tree method.  These Level 2 sequences are then gathered into the final 
end states for LERF, NO-LERF, etc.  The Wolf Creek and Peach Bottom models have no accident 
sequences at the beginning.  The test has the sequences being generated using dynamic flag sets for 
the accident sequences, and then evaluates the sequences.  The sequences are evaluated using the 
developed dynamic flag sets and then with no flag sets.
 C-17
Test – 56 End-State Gathering 
The end state gathering process is tested using the Surry LERF model and the Beaver Valley 
NUREG 1150 model.  Both models have the sequences gathered into end states.  The Surry 
LERF model uses partition rules, while the Beaver Valley model uses the end state name. 
Test–57 Compound Event Plug-ins 
The compound event plug-in is being tested for both the common cause module, utility module 
(i.e. add, multiply), and load-capacity.  The scenarios include testing the utility module and load-
capacity, testing the add and multiply functions in order to calculate the probability of the 
compound event.  Then change sets are created to affect the compound event and the final 
probability.  The results are verified to make sure the probability is correct.  Also tested is the 
load-capacity plug-in.  The values are input and the probability is calculated along with 
performing an uncertainty calculation.  The input values are also modified using a change set and 
then a new probability along with uncertainty evaluation is performed and verified to be correct. 
Test –58 Base Case Update 
All models have fault tree results and accident sequences cut sets converted to the base case.  A 
scenario for fault tree cut sets converted to the base case for comparison to the current case using 
change sets. 
Test – 59 Calculation Types
The calculation types are tested.  The “TRUE” calculation type is tested.  The “TRUE, FALSE, 
and IGNORE” calculation types are tested.  Fault trees are developed to verify the different 
calculation types are being changed in the change sets and the results are correct.  The other 
calculation types (i.e., 3, 5, and 7) are also being checked in the simple database using change 
sets.
Test – 60 Application of Change Sets 
Change sets are used in numerous databases. Both class and single event change sets are 
developed and tested.  The change sets test both probability changes and calculation type 
changes.
Test– 61 Uncertainty Distributions 
All of the uncertainty distribution types are tested.  
Test– 62 N of M Gates 
The N/M gates are tested using the simple database (SIMPLE-FT) plant model.  The N/M gate 
has multiple N/M gates feeding into it.  The N/M gate is evaluated using all of the inputs and also 
with inputs affected by change sets. 
Test – 63 Sequence Stress Testing 
Several scenarios test sequence stress (i.e., numerous sequences being generated).  An event tree 
links over and over in order to test the ability to generate numerous sequences correctly. 
Test – 64 Calculations on the Common-Cause Plug-in 
Use of the common-cause plug-ins is verified.  Basic events are tested by using change sets.  One 
set of the inputs is set TRUE.  This requires SAPHIRE to re-calculate the Common Cause Failure 
(CCF) plug-in basic event for evaluation.  The final probability is manually calculated and 
checked to the probability calculated for final verification. 
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Test – 65 Event Transformations 
This test checks the capability of SAPHIRE to turn one or more basic events into other basic 
events during the cut set generation process.  This feature is primarily used for external events 
models. 
Test - 66 Wrong Results 
This test verifies the output of results.  The output from the test is compared to incorrect results to 
verify that the comparison is worked correctly. A LOSP scenario is executed to obtain results for 
comparison. 
Below, the physical output from two of the individual tests, the PBYRN-01 test (solving for fault 
tree minimal cut sets) and the PBYRN-02 test (solving event trees for core damage cut sets) are 
shown.  Not only are each test graded on a pass/fail, but one should note that each entity (e.g., 
different fault trees, different sequences) is checked and graded on a pass/fail basis.  All total, 
there are over 250 high-level tests, where each test comprises multiple sub-tests on specific 
portions of the SAPHIRE software. 
TEST CASE: SAPHIRE QA Models (CDF_BYRN)  DATE & TIME: 8/6/03 6:09:37 PM 
Operating System:Microsoft Windows NT       
TEST FOR: SAPHIRE Version  7.20 
Opened project: bryn_2qa 
[PBYRN-01]Scenario: Solve Fault Trees started at 6:10:00 PM 
Generated base case data 
Fault trees solved 
with prob cut off (1.0E-16) 
Fault Tree base case updated 
FAULT TREE RESULTS: 
Compare Min-Cut and No. of Cut Sets: 
Fault Tree             Min-Cut      Status Failure    Base        Status Count     Status 
ACP-ST               5.300E-001  pass   5.300E-01  pass 1  pass 
AFW                    3.341E-004  pass   3.341E-04  pass 13  pass 
AFW-ATWS       2.425E-002  pass   2.425E-02  pass 14  pass 
AFW-L                3.341E-004  pass   3.341E-04  pass 13  pass 
AFW-SGTR         3.531E-004  pass   3.531E-04  pass 12  pass 
BORATION        1.000E-003  pass   1.000E-03  pass 1  pass 
COOLDOWN      3.997E-003  pass   3.997E-03  pass 2  pass 
DEP-REC            3.500E-003  pass   3.500E-03  pass 1  pass 
EP 2.889E-003  pass   2.889E-03  pass 5  pass 
F&B                     2.244E-002  pass   2.244E-02  pass 91  pass 
F&L 2.244E-002  pass   2.244E-02  pass 91  pass 
HPI 9.140E-006  pass   9.140E-06  pass 88  pass 
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HPI-L 9.140E-006  pass   9.140E-06  pass 88  pass 
HPR                     2.731E-003  pass   2.731E-03  pass 754  pass 
HPR-L                 2.731E-003  pass   2.731E-03  pass 754  pass 
LPR                      2.228E-003  pass   2.228E-03  pass 44  pass 
MFW-A               2.000E-001  pass   2.000E-01  pass 1  pass 
MFW-NT 5.000E-002  pass   5.000E-02  pass 1  pass 
MFW-T                7.840E-002  pass   7.840E-02  pass 2  pass 
OP-2H 1.200E-001  pass   1.200E-01  pass 1  pass 
Compare Mean: 
Fault Tree Mean Status Failure
ACP-ST            0.000E+00  pass 
AFW                 0.000E+00  pass 
AFW-ATWS    0.000E+00  pass 
AFW-L             0.000E+00  pass 
AFW-SGTR     0.000E+00  pass 
BORATION     0.000E+00  pass 
COOLDOW
N
0.000E+00  pass 
DEP-REC         0.000E+00  pass 
EP 0.000E+00  pass 
F&B                  0.000E+00  pass 
F&L 0.000E+00  pass 
HPI 0.000E+00  pass 
HPI-L 0.000E+00  pass 
HPR                  0.000E+00  pass 
HPR-L              0.000E+00  pass 
LPR                  0.000E+00  pass 
MFW-A            0.000E+00  pass 
MFW-NT 0.000E+00  pass 
MFW-T            0.000E+00  pass 
OP-2H 0.000E+00  pass 
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Compare Min-Cut and No. of Cut Sets: 
Fault Tree Min-Cut Status Failure Base Status Count Status
OP-6H 3.600E-002  pass   3.600E-02  pass 1  pass 
OP-BD 2.000E-002  pass   2.000E-02  pass 1  pass 
OP-SL 6.300E-001  pass   6.300E-01  pass 1  pass 
PORV 4.000E-002  pass   4.000E-02  pass 1  pass 
PORV-1 1.000E+000  pass   1.000E+00  pass 1  pass 
PORV-A 2.716E-001  pass   2.716E-01  pass 9  pass 
PORV-L 1.600E-001  pass   1.600E-01  pass 1  pass 
PORV-RES 2.454E-004  pass   2.454E-04  pass 6  pass 
PORV-SBO 3.700E-001  pass   3.700E-01  pass 1  pass 
PRVL-RES 2.454E-004  pass   2.454E-04  pass 6  pass 
RCS-DEP 3.997E-003  pass   3.997E-03  pass 2  pass 
Compare Mean: 
Fault Tree Mean Status Failure
OP-6H 0.000E+00  pass 
OP-BD 0.000E+00  pass 
OP-SL 0.000E+00  pass 
PORV 0.000E+00  pass 
PORV-1 0.000E+00  pass 
PORV-A 0.000E+00  pass 
PORV-L 0.000E+00  pass 
PORV-RES 0.000E+00  pass 
PORV-SBO 0.000E+00  pass 
PRVL-RES 0.000E+00  pass 
RCS-DEP 0.000E+00  pass 
Compare Min-Cut and No. of Cut Sets: 
Fault Tree Min-Cut Status Failure Base Status Count Status
RCS-SG 3.738E-002  pass   3.738E-02  pass 3  pass 
RCS-SG1 2.766E-002  pass   2.766E-02  pass 2  pass 
RCSPRESS 1.303E-002  pass   1.303E-02  pass 2  pass 
RHR 3.298E-003  pass   3.298E-03  pass 45  pass 
RT 5.529E-006  pass   5.529E-06  pass 3  pass 
RT-L 8.900E-008  pass   8.900E-08  pass 1  pass 
SEALLOCA 3.500E-002  pass   3.500E-02  pass 1  pass 
SG-DEP 1.000E-005  pass   1.000E-05  pass 1  pass 
SGCOOL 2.005E-001  pass   2.005E-01  pass 5  pass 
SGCOOL-L 3.404E-001  pass   3.404E-01  pass 5  pass 
SGISOL 1.099E-002  pass   1.099E-02  pass 2  pass 
SGISOL1 1.228E-002  pass   1.228E-02  pass 4  pass 
SLOCA-NR 4.300E-001  pass   4.300E-01  pass 1  pass 
THROTTLE 1.000E-002  pass   1.000E-02  pass 1  pass 
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Compare Mean: 
Fault Tree Mean Status Failure
RCS-SG 0.000E+00  pass 
RCS-SG1 0.000E+00  pass 
RCSPRESS 0.000E+00  pass 
RHR 0.000E+00  pass 
RT 0.000E+00  pass 
RT-L 0.000E+00  pass 
SEALLOCA 0.000E+00  pass 
SG-DEP 0.000E+00  pass 
SGCOOL 0.000E+00  pass 
SGCOOL-L 0.000E+00  pass 
SGISOL 0.000E+00  pass 
SGISOL1 0.000E+00  pass 
SLOCA-NR 0.000E+00  pass 
THROTTLE 0.000E+00  pass 
Scenario: Solve Fault Trees completed at 6:10:42 PM 
[PBYRN-02]Scenario: Core Damage Frequency Test started at 6:10:43 PM 
Generated base case data 
Sequences solved  
 with prob cut off (1.0E-16) and with recovery 
Event Tree base case updated 
SEQUENCE RESULTS:
Compare MinCut and No. of Cut Sets: 
Event
Tree
Sequence Min-Cut Status Failure Base Status Count Status
  LOOP   05  5.403E-12  pass   5.403E-12  pass   105 pass
  LOOP   07  5.303E-14  pass   5.303E-14  pass   43 pass
  LOOP   09  1.692E-11  pass   1.692E-11  pass   208 pass
  LOOP   10  2.376E-11  pass   2.376E-11  pass   58 pass
  LOOP   13  2.395E-12  pass   2.395E-12  pass   441 pass
  LOOP   16  1.185E-12  pass   1.185E-12  pass   270 pass
  LOOP   17  9.942E-11  pass   9.942E-11  pass   155 pass
  LOOP   18-02  4.499E-10  pass   4.499E-10  pass   5 pass
  LOOP   18-05  2.877E-13  pass   2.877E-13  pass   48 pass
  LOOP   18-07  2.595E-15  pass   2.595E-15  pass   14 pass
  LOOP   18-08  5.188E-15  pass   5.188E-15  pass   13 pass
  LOOP   18-09  5.140E-10  pass   5.140E-10  pass   5 pass
  LOOP   18-11  2.642E-10  pass   2.642E-10  pass   5 pass
  LOOP   18-14  1.683E-13  pass   1.683E-13  pass   37 pass
  LOOP   18-16  1.005E-15  pass   1.005E-15  pass   6 pass
  LOOP   18-17  2.873E-15  pass   2.873E-15  pass   9 pass
  LOOP   18-18  3.019E-10  pass   3.019E-10  pass   5 pass
  LOOP   18-20  4.354E-10  pass   4.354E-10  pass   10 pass
  LOOP   18-22  1.350E-10  pass   1.350E-10  pass   29 pass
  LOOP   19  1.424E-12  pass   1.424E-12  pass   1 pass
Compare Mean: 
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Event Tree Sequence Mean Status Failure
  LOOP   05   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   07   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   09   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   10   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   13   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   16   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   17   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-02   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-05   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-07   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-08   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-09   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-11   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-14   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-16   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-17   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-18   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-20   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   18-22   0.000E+00  pass 
  LOOP   19   0.000E+00  pass 
Compare MinCut and No. of Cut Sets: 
Event Tree Sequence Min-Cut Status Failure Base Status Count Status
  SGTR   03 5.920E-11  pass 5.920E-11  pass   82 pass
  SGTR   04 7.172E-11  pass 7.172E-11  pass   4 pass
  SGTR   05 1.630E-11  pass 1.630E-11  pass   1 pass
  SGTR   08 2.496E-12  pass 2.496E-12  pass   228 pass
  SGTR   09 3.031E-12  pass 3.031E-12  pass   24 pass
  SGTR   10 6.161E-13  pass 6.161E-13  pass   3 pass
  SGTR   11 2.156E-10  pass 2.156E-10  pass   3 pass
  SGTR   13 1.363E-13  pass 1.363E-13  pass   48 pass
  SGTR   14 0.000E+00  pass 0.000E+00  pass   0 pass
Compare Mean: 
Event Tree Sequence Mean Status Failure
  SGTR   03   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   04   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   05   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   08   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   09   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   10   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   11   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   13   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   14   0.000E+00  pass 
Compare MinCut and No. of Cut Sets: 
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Event Tree Sequence Min-Cut Status Failure Base Status Count Status
  SGTR   16 2.860E-15  pass   2.860E-15  pass   10 pass
  SGTR   17 0.000E+00  pass   0.000E+00  pass   0 pass
  SGTR   18 7.546E-16  pass   7.546E-16  pass   4 pass
  SGTR   21 1.312E-14  pass   1.312E-14  pass   28 pass
  SGTR   22 6.463E-15  pass   6.463E-15  pass   17 pass
  SGTR   23 1.483E-15  pass   1.483E-15  pass   6 pass
  SGTR   26 2.884E-16  pass   2.884E-16  pass   3 pass
  SGTR   27 8.277E-17  pass   8.277E-17  pass   2 pass
  SGTR   28 0.000E+00  pass   0.000E+00  pass   0 pass
  SGTR   29 1.975E-14  pass   1.975E-14  pass   21 pass
  SGTR   31 2.431E-17  pass   2.431E-17  pass   1 Pass
  SGTR   32 0.000E+00  pass   0.000E+00  pass   0 Pass
  SGTR   34 0.000E+00  pass   0.000E+00  pass   0 Pass
  SGTR   35 0.000E+00  pass   0.000E+00  pass   0 Pass
  SGTR   36 0.000E+00  pass   0.000E+00  pass   0 Pass
  SGTR   39 6.887E-15  pass   6.887E-15  pass   23 Pass
  SGTR   41 4.450E-17  pass   4.450E-17  pass   1 Pass
  SGTR   42 8.230E-14  pass   8.230E-14  pass   16 Pass
  SGTR   43 1.419E-13  pass   1.419E-13  pass   26 Pass
  SGTR   44 9.012E-12  pass   9.012E-12  pass   3 Pass
Compare Mean: 
Event Tree Sequence Mean Status Failure
  SGTR   16   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   17   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   18   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   21   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   22   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   23   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   26   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   27   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   28   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   29   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   31   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   32   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   34   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   35   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   36   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   39   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   41   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   42   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   43   0.000E+00  pass 
  SGTR   44   0.000E+00  pass 
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Compare MinCut and No. of Cut Sets: 
Event Tree Sequence MinCut Status Failure Base Status Coun
t
Status
  SLOCA   04   9.088E-10  pass   9.088E-10  pass   357 Pass
  SLOCA   06   1.092E-11  pass   1.092E-11  pass   236 Pass
  SLOCA   07   7.692E-12  pass   7.692E-12  pass   66 Pass
  SLOCA   11   8.798E-14  pass   8.798E-14  pass   62 Pass
  SLOCA   13   5.689E-16  pass   5.689E-16  pass   9 Pass
  SLOCA   14   2.304E-15  pass   2.304E-15  pass   10 Pass
  SLOCA   17   9.983E-15  pass   9.983E-15  pass   30 Pass
  SLOCA   19  0.000E+00  pass  0.000E+00  pass   0 Pass
  SLOCA   21   4.728E-15  pass   4.728E-15  pass   24 Pass
Compare Mean: 
Event Tree Sequence Mean Status Failure
  SLOCA   04   0.000E+00  pass 
  SLOCA   06   0.000E+00  pass 
  SLOCA   07   0.000E+00  pass 
  SLOCA   11   0.000E+00  pass 
  SLOCA   13   0.000E+00  pass 
  SLOCA   14   0.000E+00  pass 
  SLOCA   17   0.000E+00  pass 
  SLOCA   19   0.000E+00  pass 
  SLOCA   21   0.000E+00  pass 
Compare MinCut and No. of Cut Sets: 
Event Tree Sequence MinCut Status Failure Base Status Count Status
  SLOCA   22   1.920E-13  pass   1.920E-13  pass   26 pass
  SLOCA   23   1.288E-11  pass   1.288E-11  pass   3 pass
  TRANS   05   3.420E-12  pass   3.420E-12  pass   108 pass
  TRANS   07   2.545E-14  pass   2.545E-14  pass   49 pass
  TRANS   08   2.362E-13  pass   2.362E-13  pass   44 pass
  TRANS   13   8.295E-14  pass   8.295E-14  pass   69 pass
  TRANS   15   1.995E-16  pass   1.995E-16  pass   6 pass
  TRANS   16   1.493E-14  pass   1.493E-14  pass   14 pass
  TRANS   19   9.935E-13  pass   9.935E-13  pass   640 pass
  TRANS   20   3.271E-11  pass   3.271E-11  pass   134 pass
  TRANS   21-04   3.695E-13  pass   3.695E-13  pass   62 pass
  TRANS   21-06   1.817E-15  pass   1.817E-15  pass   9 pass
  TRANS   21-07   1.371E-12  pass   1.371E-12  pass   3 pass
  TRANS   21-11   7.246E-14  pass   7.246E-14  pass   36 pass
  TRANS   21-13  0.000E+00  pass   0.000E+00  pass   0 pass
  TRANS   21-14   2.742E-13  pass   2.742E-13  pass   3 pass
  TRANS   21-15   6.675E-12  pass   6.675E-12  pass   21 pass
  TRANS   21-16   1.788E-11  pass   1.788E-11  pass   6 pass
 C-25
 C-26
Compare Mean: 
Event Tree Sequence Mean Status Failure
  SLOCA   22   0.000E+00  pass 
  SLOCA   23   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   05   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   07   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   08   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   13   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   15   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   16   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   19   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   20   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   21-04   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   21-06   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   21-07   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   21-11   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   21-13   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   21-14   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   21-15   0.000E+00  pass 
  TRANS   21-16   0.000E+00  pass 
Scenario: Core Damage Frequency Test completed at 6:11:42 PM 
TEST CASE COMPLETE: at 6:11:45 PM 
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